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83 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUN PRINTING  
George M. Cohen*  
Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic 
which is supposed to leave them no alternative.  They deplore the sacrificial rite.  
They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the 
knife that they obey the bidding of their office.  The victim is offered up to the gods 
of jurisprudence.1 
INTRODUCTION  
Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & 
Power Co.2 is Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s testament to the value of 
certainty in business transactions and the law of contracts, a value 
that elsewhere he deemed subordinate to the demands of justice.3  
Joined by four other judges, Cardozo famously refused to enforce an 
agreement between two large companies for the purchase and sale of 
paper because the parties left open for future agreement (after an 
initial four-month period) not only the price term but also the 
 
*Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law, University of Virginia.  I thank Leslie Ashbrook of the 
UVA Law Library and Faith Pang for excellent research assistance and participants in the 
Touro Law School conference on Benjamin N. Cardozo: Judge, Justice, Scholar for helpful 
comments. 
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924). 
2 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923). 
3 See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).  In that famous case, Cardozo 
states: 
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development of 
legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result 
will be troubled by a classification where the lines of division are so 
wavering and blurred.  Something, doubtless, may be said on the score 
of consistency and certainty in favor of a stricter standard.  The courts 
have balanced such considerations against those of equity and fairness, 
and found the latter to be the weightier.  The decisions in this state 
commit us to the liberal view, which is making its way, nowadays, in 
jurisdictions slow to welcome it. 
Id. at 891-92. 
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duration of the price term.4  Almost a century later, the case remains 
a prominent example of the contract doctrine of “uncertainty” or 
“indefiniteness,” under which courts decline to enforce contracts that 
omit one or more material terms.  The indefiniteness doctrine retains  
its vitality in the courts,5 and Sun Printing remains good law in New 
York as well as a staple of contracts casebooks.6  All that despite the 
efforts of the Uniform Commercial Code7 and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts8 to encourage courts to fill in gaps left by the 
parties where possible, a practice for which Cardozo himself was 
well-known, at least in other cases.  The questions of why contracting 
parties leave gaps in their contracts and what courts should do in 
response has also in recent years attracted a significant amount of 
academic interest.9 
Yet I have always found Sun Printing to be a very confusing 
and frustrating opinion.  Cardozo’s rhetoric and logic has a certain 
force, as it always does, but something has always seemed somewhat 
off in a sense not present in his other contract law cases.  Many 
commentators have pointed out a tension between Cardozo’s Sun 
Printing opinion and his other contract opinions and have seen the 
main puzzle to be how, if at all, his approaches in the different cases 
can be reconciled.10  But none of the prominent commentators who 
have offered views on the case has succeeded in uncovering the nub 
of the problem.  This is perhaps not surprising, given that no one to 
date has undertaken a thorough examination of the case and the 
surrounding circumstances.  Doing so only enhances frustration with 
Cardozo’s opinion, but opens up an interesting and fresh perspective 
on a number of aspects of the case.  My conclusion is that Cardozo 
mischaracterized and misunderstood the contract, that his opinion is 
more likely to have increased uncertainty rather than alleviated it, and 
 
4 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470. 
5 See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1641, 1643-44 (2003). 
6 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS 422 (4th ed. 2008); STEVEN J. BURTON, 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 89 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN F. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT 
HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS 376 (9th ed. 2008); 
BRUCE FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 93 (3d ed. 2012). 
7 U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-305. 
8 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 33. 
9 See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1673-75 (2006). 
10 See infra p. 124. 
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that he may unwittingly have helped facilitate and perpetuate 
anticompetitive activity in the newsprint paper industry. 
I begin by detailing Cardozo’s opinion in the case, Judge 
Crane’s dissent, and Cardozo’s subsequent thoughts about the case.  I 
then summarize the existing academic criticism of the case before 
turning to an examination of the historical and economic context of 
the contract.  Finally, I use that understanding to offer a new critique 
of Cardozo’s opinion. 
I.  THE SUN PRINTING CASE  
A.  The Record 
Before turning to Cardozo’s analysis of the case, it will be 
helpful to consider the record as it would have appeared to him.  On 
August 5, 1921, the Sun Printing & Publishing Association filed a 
complaint in New York state court alleging that the Remington Paper 
& Power Company, Inc. had breached a contract with Sun Printing 
for the delivery of newsprint paper.  




IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants and 
agreements hereinafter set forth, REMINGTON PAPER & POWER 
CO., INC., of Watertown, State of New York, hereinafter 
called the Seller, agrees to sell and hereby does sell and THE 
SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASSO., of New York City, State 
of New York, hereinafter called the Purchaser, agrees to buy 
and pay for, and hereby does buy the following paper. 
 
Tonnage. 
Sixteen Thousand Tons rolls News Print, Basis 24x36-  
32/500. 
65% of the tonnage in rolls 73” in width. 
15% of the tonnage in rolls 55” in width. 
20% of the tonnage in rolls 36½” in width. 
 
11 Complaint at 7-11, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 
N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) (italics added in the key paragraph in dispute) 
[hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
3
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Shipments. 
One thousand tons per month in herein specified 
percentages of sizes during the months of September, 1919, to 
December 1920, inclusive. 
 
Consignee. 
Sun Printing & Publishing Association, Pier 34, East 
River, New York City. 
 
Specifications. 
The paper shall be of substantially the same average 
quality as sample attached to this agreement and of 
approximately the basis of weight as above named, without 
reference to production basis. 
Five per cent. (5%) over or under the contract basis of 
weight, shall be considered good delivery. 
Use by the PURCHASER of any paper delivered under this 
contract, even though not in conformity to the standard, shall, 
as to said paper, be a waiver of all claims. 
Width of rolls are not to be changed excepting with the 
consent of the SELLER. 
 
Price and Delivery. 
The price shall be as hereinafter provided per one hundred 
(100) pounds actual gross weight of rolls on board cars at 




Payments shall be made in New York Exchange, net cash 




On request of the Seller the Purchaser will on the 16th and 
last day of each month make settlement by Trade Acceptance 
payable without interest on the due date of the account for all 
shipments made during the previous fifteen day period. 
The price agreed upon between the parties hereto for all 
4
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paper shipped during the month of September, 1919, shall be 
$3.73 ¾ per hundred pounds gross weight of rolls on board 
cars at Mills. 
The price agreed upon between the parties hereto for all 
shipments made during the months of October, November and 
December, 1919, shall be $4.00 per hundred pounds gross 
weight of rolls on board cars at mills. 
For the balance of the period of this agreement the price 
of the paper and length of terms for which such price shall 
apply shall be agreed upon by and between the parties hereto 
fifteen days prior to the expiration of each period for which 
the price and length of term thereof have been previously 
agreed upon, said price in no event to be higher than the 
contract price for news print charged by the Canadian Export 
Paper Company to the large consumers, the seller to receive 
the benefit of any differentials in freight rates. 
It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the 
tonnage specified herein is for use in the printing and 
publication of the various editions of the Daily and Sunday 
New York Sun, and any variation from this will be considered 
a breach of contract. 
 
Cores. 
Cores may be returned to the SELLER, Norfolk, N.Y., 
freight prepaid, and upon receipt in good condition, the 
SELLER will either remit in cash or credit the account of the 
PURCHASER at ten cents per lineal foot for all cores received 
in good condition. No allowance will be made for cores of 




No allowance shall be made for waste, damage or paper 
left on cores. In case of claim of any nature applying on any 
shipment of paper made under this contract, the SELLER shall 




In case the SELLER shall be unable and fail at any time to 
5
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make and supply, or the PURCHASER shall be unable and fail 
to take and use said paper in consequence of strikes, fire, 
explosion, lock-outs, combinations of workmen, flood, 
drought, embargoes, war, the acts of God, the public enemy, 
or any cause beyond the control of either party hereto, the 
SELLER shall not be liable to the PURCHASER for failure to 
supply such paper, nor shall the PURCHASER be liable to the 




If the PURCHASER shall fail to pay any amounts when due 
under this contract, or fail to make settlements as provided 
herein, the SELLER may, at its option, cancel this contract, 
refuse to furnish any more paper thereunder, and declare the 
obligations of the PURCHASER for all paper furnished 
hereunder due forthwith, notwithstanding the terms hereof, 
but the PURCHASER shall remain liable to the SELLER for all 
loss and damage sustained by reason of such failure. 
 
THIS AGREEMENT is executed in duplicate original and 
shall be governed by the laws of the place of the legal 
domicile of the SELLER. 
 
REMINGTON PAPER & POWER CO., INC.,  
By M.A. HANNA V.P. 
 
THE SUN PRINTING & PUBLISHING ASSOCIATION,  
By V.H. POLACHEK 
 
Watertown, N.Y., Oct. 6th 1919. 
 
The only other information the Complaint provides about the 
contract was that it “was prepared by or on behalf of [Remington] by 
filling in by typewriting blank spaces in a printed form of agreement 
that [Remington] had caused to be printed in advance for use in the 
conduct of its business.”12 
The Complaint then alleges that Remington delivered 4000 
 
12 Id. at ¶ V. 
6
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tons of newsprint between September 1919 and December 1919, and 
Sun Printing paid for that newsprint, as required by the contract.13  
During that time, however, “the supply of newsprint paper such as 
that referred to in said agreement became scarce within the city and 
the state of New York and elsewhere in the United States and that the 
market price of such newsprint paper . . . rose materially and 
substantially.”14  On December 5, 1919, Remington “repudiated and 
abandoned” the contract, notifying Sun Printing that the agreement 
was “not binding.”  Remington did not deliver any newsprint to Sun 
Printing after January 1, 1920.15 
According to the Complaint, Sun Printing responded to 
Remington by demanding that Remington deliver to Sun Printing 
“during each month of the year 1920 one thousand tons of newsprint 
paper . . . at the contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian 
Export Paper Company to the large consumers, [Remington] to 
receive the benefit of any differentials in freight rates.”16  Sun 
Printing repeated this same demand every month in 1920.17  The 
Complaint alleges that this contract price was “readily 
ascertainable”18 and that Sun Printing was “ready, able and willing to 
pay” it.19 
Finally, the Complaint alleges that as a result of Remington’s 
failure to perform the contract, Sun Printing incurred damages of 
$1,510,000, comprised of $910,000 in “general” damages20 and 
$600,000 in “special” damages.21  Although the Complaint does not 
explain the calculation of “general” damages, it is likely based on the 
difference between the Canadian Export Company contract price over 
the 12-month period of 1920 and the higher market prices for 
newsprint.22  The grounds for the alleged “special” damages were 
 
13 Id. at ¶ VI. 
14 Id. at ¶ VII. 
15 Id. at ¶ IX. 
16 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ X. 
17 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XIII. 
18 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XI. 
19 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XII. 
20 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XV. 
21 Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XVI. 
22 See Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XIV (alleging that the market price was higher than 
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price at all times during 1920); see also 
Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ XVI (alleging that Sun Printing had to pay as much as $.1175 
per pound ($11.75 per 100 pounds) for newsprint in the market).  Sun Printing’s appellate 
brief confirms that “general damages . . . should be measured by the difference between the 
7
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that Sun Printing was not able to buy substitute newsprint on the 
market in sufficient quantities to satisfy its publishing needs, and as a 
result had to buy inferior quality newsprint, reduce the size of its 
newspapers, and reject profitable advertising.23 
Remington responded to Sun Printing’s complaint with a 
demurrer, alleging simply that the complaint did not state a cause of 
action because the contract “does not specify a price to be paid by 
[Sun Printing] for paper covered by the contract to be delivered after 
January 1, 1920, but leaves the price to be fixed by future agreement, 
and is void for want of mutuality.”24  On December 5, 1921, Sun 
Printing moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court 
denied without opinion on December 20, 1921, giving Sun Printing 
leave to file an amended complaint.25  
Sun Printing then appealed to the Appellate Division, which 
reversed (3-2), and issued a written opinion.26  The Appellate 
Division agreed with Sun Printing that the contract’s maximum price 
provision effectively gave Sun Printing an “option” to pay the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price after January 1, 1920, which 
Sun Printing exercised by agreeing to pay this price.27  The court 
found that this price was definite and that Sun Printing had given 
consideration for the option in the form of the price Sun Printing had 
paid for the earlier deliveries of newsprint.28  The court noted: “There 
is no other part of the contract that is claimed to be indefinite.”29  
Lastly, the court added that Remington by its demurrer conceded that 
the Canadian Export Paper Company price was ascertainable, and 
that “the fact that the selling price may vary from month to month 
does not affect the validity of the contract.”30 
Remington appealed to the New York Court of Appeals under 
the certified question of whether the complaint stated sufficient facts 
 
Canadian contract price” for each month and the “market price” during that month.  Brief for 
Respondent at 44, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 
470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Respondent’s Brief”]. 
23 Id. at 44-45. 
24 Transcript of Record at 19, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power 
Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Record”]. 
25 Id. at 2-4. 
26 Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1922). 
27 Id. at 701. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 702. 
8
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to constitute a cause of action.31  In its Appellant’s Brief, Remington 
argued against Sun Printing’s “option” theory, introducing for the 
first time the point, which it made repeatedly, that the parties did not 
intend an option because the contract required agreement not only on 
price but also on “the length of terms for which such price shall 
apply.”32  Remington contended that the “Canadian Export price, 
which respondent claims should apply, was, however, not a fixed 
price but a price constantly changing from month to month and from 
time to time with the fluctuations of the paper market indicated by the 
allegations in the complaint.”33  Moreover, Remington argued that 
the determination of price duration was important to Remington “in 
order that it might, in the fluctuating state of the market, be sure of 
some definite time for which the price agreed upon would hold.”34  
The Canadian Export Paper Company price would not solve this 
problem, because the parties could agree to a time period for the price 
during which the Canadian Export Paper Company price might 
change.  The contract price would match the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price “in the event only that the agreement as to price 
coincided with the Canadian Export price and the latter price did not 
fluctuate during the period of the agreement.”35 
In its Respondent’s Brief, Sun Printing built on the option 
argument that had succeeded in the Appellate Division.  It argued that 
 
31 Record, supra note 24, at 19. 
32 Brief of Appellant at 4, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 
139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921) [hereinafter “Brief of Remington”]; see also id. 
at 5 (arguing that Remington “did not give an option as to price . . . by an agreement which 
provided that the price and the length of time such price should apply should be agreed upon 
by the parties”); id. at 6 (“There is no mistaking the meaning and intention of the parties that 
there should be future agreements as to prices to be charged for 1920 and as to periods 
agreed prices should cover.”); id. at 7 (“There is no period fixed for which respondent shall 
exercise its alleged option to buy in case of a failure to agree as to price and term, whether a 
month, or a day, or the whole year, and no provision for notice of the exercise of such 
option.”); id. at 14 (“Not only did the parties reserve the price for future agreement but also 
left the length of time the price was to run to be decided.”). 
33 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 10. 
34 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 15. 
35 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 16.  Remington offered a hypothetical example in 
which Sun Printing and Remington agreed to a price of $5 per 100 pounds for 3 months, but 
the Canadian Export Paper Company lowered its price to $4 during that time.  Remington 
argued that the $5 price would prevail despite the drop in the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price.  On the other hand, if the Canadian Export Paper Company price was $4 at 
the time the price term was agreed to and subsequently rose to $5 during the three-month 
period, the contract price (in this case $4) would again prevail.  Brief of Remington, supra 
note 32, at 15. 
9
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the “provision of the agreement fixing the maximum price to be 
charged during 1920 was [Sun Printing’s] measure of protection in 
respect of price,”36 and that if it had not been given the protection of 
the price maximum, it would not have made the contract with 
Remington at all.37  Instead, it would have contracted with the 
Canadian Export Paper Company.38  Remington’s approach rendered 
the price maximum term Sun Printing had bargained for 
meaningless.39  Sun Printing added that whatever hardship the 
changed market conditions created for Remington, “if such price 
were not ruinous to the Canadian Company, it ought not to be 
presumed that it would be ruinous to [Remington].”40 
With respect to the Canadian Export Paper Company contract 
price, Sun Printing argued that it did not have to allege or prove that 
this price did not vary, because even if the price 
did vary from time to time during the year 1920, that 
circumstance would not make the contract indefinite 
or uncertain or incomplete, so long as . . . the price of 
newsprint to be delivered under the contract . . . 
during any given month could be fixed by reference to 
an admittedly definite and well defined standard price 
for that month, namely, ‘the contract price for 
newsprint charged by the Canadian Export Paper 
Company to the large consumers.’41  
Once Sun Printing agreed to pay the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price, the contract did not “require any further consent by 
[Remington] either as to price or length of term.”42  As Sun Printing 
had alleged in its complaint, it demanded during every month of 1920 
that Remington provide the contracted-for newsprint at the Canadian 
Export Paper Company price.43 
In its Reply Brief, Remington argued that Sun Printing 
“entirely ignores the point that length of term was as important as 
 
36 Brief of Remington, supra note 32, at 22. 
37 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 11-12. 
38 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 12, 21, 26. 
39 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 25. 
40 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 43. 
41 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 17-18, 42. 
42 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 29. 
43 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 22, at 40-41. 
10
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price and that both were to be agreed upon.”44  Remington focused on 
the phrase “said price” in the clause containing the maximum price 
provision, arguing that “‘[s]aid price’ was not a fluctuating price, 
varying from day to day, or week to week, or month to month, with 
the Canadian [E]xport price, . . . but was a fixed price for a stated and 
agreed term.”45  Thus, as Remington had argued in its initial brief, the 
price “was to remain as fixed for such term, irrespective of whether 
the Canadian price went above or fell below it.”46 
B.  Cardozo’s Opinion 
Cardozo, joined by four other judges, reversed the Appellate 
Division.47  Cardozo opens the opinion with a brief and 
straightforward summary of the facts as alleged by Sun Printing in its 
complaint.48  Cardozo presents us with a seller and a buyer of paper, 
some contract terms agreed to by the parties, performance on both 
sides for four months, and then notice by the seller to the buyer that 
the contract was “imperfect” and that the seller “disclaimed” any 
future obligations.49  There are none of the rhetorical flights of fancy 
found in the statement of facts in some of Cardozo’s other famous 
opinions.50  The language is plain and workmanlike.  The message is 
clear: this case is a standard one for which ordinary legal principles 
suffice. 
If Cardozo’s factual presentation is spare, his legal analysis, 
though typically concise, is quite complex and worthy of careful 
examination. Cardozo begins by accepting the framing of 
Remington’s counsel in its brief that the contract left two terms for 
 
44 Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & 
Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923) (No. 30495-1921). 
45 Id. at 6. 
46 Id. at 7. 
47 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 472. 
48 Id. at 470. 
49 Id. 
50 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), which 
famously opens with: 
The defendant styles herself a ‘creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a 
sale. Manufacturers of dresses, millinery and like articles are glad to pay 
for a certificate of her approval. The things which she designs, fabric, 
parasols and what not, have a new value in the public mind when issued 
in her name. She employed the plaintiff to help her to turn this vogue 
into money. 
11
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the parties to negotiate beginning in December 1919: the price and 
the duration of that price.  He then suggests that if the parties had 
omitted only the price term, he might have been willing to endorse 
Sun Printing’s legal theory, and enforce the contract as one giving the 
buyer an “option” to pay the maximum Canadian Export Paper 
Company price referenced in the contract for the remainder of the 
contract term.51  Omitting the price duration term, however, was too 
much, especially because the contract expressly stated that the 
“length of terms for which such price shall apply shall be agreed 
upon by and between the parties,”52 and did not provide for a 
maximum (or minimum) price duration.  Thus, reasons Cardozo, 
giving the buyer an option to choose to pay the maximum price “does 
not dispense with the necessity for agreement in respect of the term 
during which the price is to apply.”53 
 
51 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470. Cardozo here cites one of his earlier opinions, Cohen & 
Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370 (N.Y. 1921). In that case, the buyer agreed to buy a 
fixed quantity of cloth at a stated price with the “privilege . . . to confirm more” if the seller 
could get more.  After the seller delivered the fixed quantity agreed to, the buyer, “exercising 
its option,” demanded as much more of the cloth as the seller could procure.  The seller 
delivered a small amount more but much less than it had in fact procured.  Cardozo held that 
the buyer could enforce the contract and rejected a claim of indefiniteness, because the 
contract gave the buyer the right to “fix the quantity, subject only to the proviso that the 
quantity shall be limited by ability to supply.” Id. at 370-71.  In rejecting the indefiniteness 
claim, Cardozo stated: 
The [seller], then, is bound, unless its promise is to be ignored as 
meaningless. Rejection on that ground is at best a last resort. . . . 
Indefiniteness must reach the point where construction becomes futile. 
Uncertainties, thought to be impenetrable, are suggested [by the seller] in 
respect of subject matter, time, and price. They will be found to be 
unreal. It is said that we cannot tell whether the buyer, in exercising the 
option, must make demand for all the seller can supply, or is free to call 
for less. We think the implication plain that the buyer is to fix the 
quantity, subject only to the proviso that quantity shall be limited by 
ability to supply. It is said the option does not state the time within 
which election is to be announced. We think a reasonable time is a term 
implied by law. . . . It is said that the option does not embody a statement 
of the price. We think a ‘privilege to confirm more’ imports a privilege 
to confirm at the price of the initial quantity. This option was drawn by 
merchants. We are persuaded that merchants reading it would not be 
doubtful of its meaning. It was meant to accomplish something. We find 
no such elements of vagueness as to justify the conclusion that in reality 
it accomplished nothing. 
Id. The intermediate appellate court in Sun Printing quoted this passage in support of its 
decision upholding the contract.  Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power 
Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922). 
52 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 470. 
53 Id. at 471. 
12
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To Cardozo, the importance of the price duration term seems 
to be a logical implication from the fact that a maximum price and a 
price duration are different things.  Cardozo states: “Agreement upon 
a maximum payable this month or to-day is not the same as an 
agreement that it shall continue to be payable next month or to-
morrow.”54  Thus, if the buyer agreed (exercised its “option”) to pay 
the maximum for some stated duration, say one month, the buyer 
would not be bound to that same maximum price (or a changed 
maximum price) beyond that month.  Next, following a line of 
reasoning in Remington’s brief, Cardozo notes that if the parties had 
agreed on an initial price duration, they would not have been obliged 
to follow any change in the Canadian Export Paper Company price 
that might occur during that period.  That is, the contract price during 
the agreed-upon duration would be fixed, and therefore would not 
fluctuate with the Canadian Export Paper Company price, even if that 
price changed during the relevant period.  In Cardozo’s words, “the 
standard was to be applied at the beginning of the successive terms, 
but once applied was to be maintained until the term should have 
expired.”55  From these observations, Cardozo abruptly concludes 
that in the absence of agreement on the duration of the price, “the 
contract was inchoate.”56  Why that conclusion follows is not 
immediately obvious. 
But Cardozo is just getting started.  He next aims to rebut Sun 
Printing’s argument that the price duration term was not material 
because the buyer continued to exercise its option at the maximum 
(Canadian Export Paper Company) price for the remainder of the 
contract.  Or as Cardozo puts the argument, “there was no need of an 
agreement as to time unless the price to be paid was lower than the 
maximum.”57  Cardozo gives several responses to this argument. 
First, and most simply, he says that there is “no evidence of this 





57 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
58 Id.  What Cardozo means by “this intention” is not clear.  The argument that the price 
duration did not matter so long as Sun Printing chose the Canadian Export Paper Company 
maximum price is based on an implication from the structure of the contract.  A structural 
interpretation argument finds “evidence” of the parties’ “intention” in the language of the 
contract and inferences that can reasonably be drawn from such language.  What Cardozo 
seems to mean is that there is no evidence based on the contract’s language that the parties 
13
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Second, and more crucially, Cardozo contends that 
Remington would not likely have agreed to the option view of the 
contract because under that interpretation, Remington “would never 
know where it stood.”59  That would be so in part because Sun 
Printing, as it conceded, “was under no duty to accept the Canadian 
standard,”60 meaning that Sun Printing would have been able to 
abandon the contract at any time the price was to be renegotiated 
(even though Sun Printing in fact never expressed any such intention 
throughout the duration of the contract).  Cardozo continues: 
Without an agreement as to time, however, there 
would be not one option, but a dozen. The Canadian 
price to-day might be less than the Canadian price to-
morrow. Election by the buyer to proceed with 
performance at the price prevailing in one month 
would not bind it to proceed at the price prevailing in 
another. Successive options to be exercised every 
month would thus be read into the contract. Nothing in 
the wording discloses the intention of the seller to 
place itself to that extent at the mercy of the buyer.61  
Cardozo then acknowledges that an alternative interpretation 
of the option theory would be that if the parties could not agree in 
December 1919 on the price and price duration, Sun Printing was 
entitled to exercise the option to pay the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price only once, but then was bound to pay whatever that 
price happened to be for the remainder of the contract.  But even in 
that case, says Cardozo, “the difficulty would not be ended.”62  The 
“difficulty” Cardozo identifies is that although “[m]arket prices in 
1920 happened to rise,”63 they might have fallen.  In the falling 
market price scenario, the “seller’s position” would be adversely 
affected because, in the absence of an agreement about price 
 
intended that the buyer would be able to enforce the contract by continually agreeing to pay 
the maximum price.  It is true that the contract does not expressly permit the buyer to do that, 
but neither does it expressly state an intention that the seller could abandon the contract in 





62 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
63 Id. 
14
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duration, “the maximum would be lowered from one shipment to 
another with every reduction of the standard,”64 resulting in 
decreasing payments to the seller over time.  That is, Cardozo 
interprets a one-time execution of the option to mean that Sun 
Printing would agree in December 1919 to pay whatever the 
Canadian Export Paper Company (and hence, Cardozo apparently 
assumes, market) price turned out to be at each remaining month of 
the contract (presumably 15 days before the beginning of each 
month).  If that price fell over time, Remington would make less and 
less money over the course of the year.65  Cardozo’s overall point is 
that under either the multiple option or single option theory, the 
contract would lack the “stability and certainty” that would come 
from an agreement on the duration of the revised price. 
Having dispensed with the option theory on the grounds that it 
would place Remington at Sun Printing’s mercy and deprive 
Remington of the stability and certainty to which it was apparently 
entitled, Cardozo next rejects enforcing the contract based either on 
the parties’ reasons for leaving out the price duration term or on the 
seller’s motives in refusing to agree to one once the express price 
term expired.  Cardozo thought that the reason for the parties’ 
omitting the price duration term was irrelevant.  Cardozo speculates 
that the parties might have deliberately left the price duration term for 
subsequent negotiation and agreement because they believed that the 
“contingency” of failing to reach agreement later was “remote.”66  To 
Cardozo, however, whatever reason the parties may have had for 
failing to fill the gap (“whether through design or through 
inadvertence”) did not matter because the parties had merely made an 
“agreement to agree,” which a court could not enforce.67  With 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 470-71.  This interpretation seems to be in some tension with Cardozo’s earlier 
point that the maximum price at which the buyer exercised its option was to be fixed during 
the relevant period, and so any fluctuation in that maximum would not matter.  Cardozo 
avoids the inconsistency, however, by assuming that the relevant (default) duration of the 
price resulting from the one-time exercise of the option would not be the remaining term of 
the contract, but rather one month, the period specified in the Sun Printing-Remington 
contract for each delivery and payment. Essentially, the argument recalls Cardozo’s initial 
statement that agreeing to the maximum for one month is not the same as agreeing to the 
maximum for subsequent months. 
66 Id. at 471. 
67 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.  For the proposition that agreements to agree are not 
enforceable, Cardozo cites a New York Court of Appeals case also involving a contract for 
newsprint and decided several months earlier, St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings 
15
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respect to the seller’s motives, Cardozo says that if the contract is 
unenforceable due to indefiniteness, the party disadvantaged by 
performance of the contract has a “legal right” to abandon it.68  That 
right, Cardozo contends, “is not affected by our appraisal of the 
motive.”69 
 
Paper Co., 138 N.E. 495 (1923).  In fact, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in St. Regis was 
issued between the date Sun Printing submitted its brief and the date of Remington’s Reply 
Brief, which cited the opinion as supportive of Remington’s position. In St. Regis, the parties 
agreed to a fixed price for the first three months of a two-year contract.  After that, the 
contract stated that the: 
price for the balance of the year to be fixed by mutual consent. In the 
event that the parties to this agreement shall fail to arrange a price for 
any quarter before the expiration of the preceding three months, this 
contract, in so far as it pertains to delivery over the unexpired period 
shall terminate. 
St. Regis Paper Co., 138 N.E. at 496.  Because the contract in St. Regis expressly stated that 
it would “terminate” if the parties failed to reach agreement on price, the case was arguably 
distinguishable from Sun Printing, whose contract contained no such clause, but Cardozo 
does not note the distinction.  On the other hand, there were other New York cases refusing 
to enforce indefinite contracts that Cardozo could have cited (some of which he does cite 
elsewhere in the opinion) in which the contract did not expressly state what the parties 
wanted to happen if they could not reach agreement on the open term. 
68  Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Cardozo again cites St. Regis in support. After setting 
forth the proposition that an agreement to agree is not enforceable, St. Regis does state that 
the seller “exercised its legal right in refusing to be bound thereby.” St. Regis Paper Co., 138 
N.E. at 497. 
69  Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471.  For the proposition that the motives of the party 
seeking to avoid an indefinite contract are immaterial, Cardozo cites an older (pre-Cardozo) 
New York Court of Appeals case, Mayer v. McCreery, 23 N.E. 1045 (1890). In that case, a 
building owner accepted a proposal from a prospective tenant stating that the tenant would 
“take your building, 483 Fifth avenue, on a twenty-one years’ lease from May 1, 1885, to be 
altered by you similar to one Hume & Co. is now altering, and floors, etc., arranged as 
spoken about, etc., at the yearly rent of $5,250 for each year of the term, net rent, no taxes, 
assessments, etc. Plans, etc., to be mutually agreed upon.” Id. at 1045. The court held that the 
statement that the plans were “to be mutually agreed upon” rendered the contract indefinite 
and unenforceable.  With respect to the landlord’s motive, the court stated: 
The motives of the defendant for his refusal are wholly immaterial; 
whether they were because he thought he could make a more favorable 
agreement with some other person, or because he thought there was 
some difficulty in the deeds upon which he held title, which prevented 
him from leasing the premises for the purposes intended, is a matter of 
no importance. 
Id. at 1046. An alternative approach that one might have thought Cardozo would endorse 
would be that the landlord’s motive could suggest that the lack of specification of the 
“plans” was not material given that they were apparently to be “similar” to the alterations 
being done on another building.  Cf. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-92 (N.Y. 
1921) (holding that a builder’s failure to use “Reading” pipe in a house was not a condition 
on the owner’s making the final payment in part because there was no material difference in 
the pipe that was installed and suggesting that the owner’s conduct in failing to inspect the 
16
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At this point, Cardozo offers his strongest and most general 
statement against contractual gap-filling by courts.  He rejects the 
suggestion that the court could force the seller  
to accept a term that would be reasonable in view of 
the nature of the transaction and the practice of the 
business. To hold it to such a standard is to make the 
contract over. The defendant reserved the privilege of 
doing its business in its own way, and did not 
undertake to conform to the practice and beliefs of 
others.70  
 
pipe upon arrival, delaying in notifying the builder of the defect, and insisting that even 
covered up pipe be removed supported the finding of immateriality); see also George M. 
Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 
990-92 (1992). 
70 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Cardozo here cites United Press v. New York Press Co., 
58 N.E. 527 (1900), another pre-Cardozo indefiniteness case, which was the basis on which 
two judges dissented in the Appellate Division, Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington 
Paper & Power Co., 193 N.Y.S. 698, 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), and which both parties 
discussed in their briefs. In that case, United Press agreed to supply its “nightly report” to 
New York Press for a price “not exceeding three hundred dollars during each and every 
week that said news report is received” 1892 to 1900. United Press, 58 N.E. at 527. New 
York Press performed for two years and then informed United Press that it would no longer 
take the report because it needed to cut costs. The parties attempted to negotiate a new price 
but could not come to an agreement. On the page cited by Cardozo, the court states: 
The effect upon the instrument of its indefiniteness, or uncertainty, as to 
the price to be paid, was to make it operative only so long as the parties 
chose, and were able, to agree upon the price per week. In other words, 
whether it should have contractual force, would depend upon the 
subsequent agreement of the parties and, manifestly, if anything 
remained to be done by them, relating to the subject-matter of the 
contract, it was an incomplete and unenforceable instrument. The 
payment of $300 each week in the past, for the news report furnished, 
was not an acknowledgment of an obligation to pay that amount during 
the whole contemplated life of the contract. . . . It is evident that the 
parties recognized their contract to be uncertain, or indefinite, as to the 
price, from their correspondence and the efforts to come to a mutual 
understanding and agreement upon the subject. 
Id. at 529. The statement does not support Cardozo’s contention that the court should not 
require contracting parties to “conform to the practice and beliefs of others,” a kind of trade 
usage argument. Instead, United Press rejects a course of performance argument for 
resolving indefiniteness, and infers from the parties’ failed attempts at renegotiation an 
intention not to be bound if they could not agree on a new price.  Id.  Neither situation was 
present in Sun Printing. United Press is also distinguishable from Sun Printing because in 
United Press, the buyer was seeking to escape from a contract with a price maximum, 
whereas in Sun Printing, it was the seller who was trying to escape from a contract with a 
price maximum, a point conceded by Remington in its brief. See Brief of Remington, supra 
note 32, at 11. Thus, the “option” argument was not available in United Press because the 
“wrong” party was seeking to escape the contract. The intermediate appellate court in Sun 
17
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This statement seems to endorse a textualist approach to 
interpretation as best reflecting the parties’ intentions.  Reiterating 
this point, Cardozo next rejects a specific “reasonable term” – a 
monthly price duration – as inconsistent with the language of the 
contract, which states that the price term is “to expire at such 
intervals as the agreement may prescribe.”71  Cardozo then notes that 
the parties could have, “with little change of language,”72 written a 
definitive term, but they did not.  He then triumphantly concludes the 
paragraph with the opinion’s most memorable line: “We are not at 
liberty to revise while professing to construe.”73  Classic Cardozo. 
The remaining two paragraphs of the opinion respond to two 
additional arguments.  First, Cardozo returns to the question of the 
nature of the Canadian Export Paper Company price maximum.  This 
time, Cardozo considers a suggestion by the dissent that this price 
might have stayed constant throughout 1920, thus rendering 
irrelevant the concerns Cardozo had expressed earlier in the opinion 
about a fluctuating maximum price, and rendering the price duration 
term immaterial.  Cardozo answers that it was up to Sun Printing as 
the plaintiff to allege that the Canadian Export Paper Company price 
was fixed for the remaining twelve months of the contract, but Sun 
Printing had not done so either in its complaint, or in its brief, or at 
oral argument.  In fact, Cardozo notes, Sun Printing’s conduct in 
coming back to Remington each month to demand delivery at the 
 
Printing distinguished United Press on the ground that in that case there was no 
consideration given for an option, whereas there was consideration in Sun Printing based on 
the definite price stated for the first four months. Sun Printing, 193 N.Y.S. at 701. 
71 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. Here Cardozo takes a small but significant liberty with 
the facts.  He ignores the mandatory nature of the language in the contract (the future price 
and price duration “shall be agreed upon”) by stating that the contract states that the prices 
“are to expire at such intervals as the agreement may prescribe.” Cardozo repeats this 
mischaracterization in his description of the case in The Growth of the Law. CARDOZO, supra 
note 1, at 109 (stating that the price was to continue “for such a time, as buyer and seller 
might agree”) (emphasis added). It is true, however, that in the traditional interpretation of 
the “agreement to agree” rule, the difference between “shall” and “may” or “might” does not 
matter. In The Growth of the Law, Cardozo also allows himself a slight exaggeration 
concerning the facts of Sun Printing when he describes the contract as involving a “stated 
term of years,” rather than the actual contract duration of sixteen months. CARDOZO, 
GROWTH OF THE LAW, supra note 1, at 109. 
72 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
73 Id. Cardozo was fond enough of this aphorism that he quoted it in an opinion he wrote 
later that year in support of a literal interpretation of an insurance contract provision. 
Goldstein v. Standard Accident Ins., 140 N.E. 235, 237 (N.Y. 1923). Several years later, 
however, Cardozo dissented from an opinion in which the majority quoted the line. Graf v. 
Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930). 
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maximum price then prevailing suggested that Sun Printing thought 
the maximum price was likely to fluctuate from month to month.74  
Lastly, Cardozo raises the possibility that if Sun Printing, 
having agreed to pay the maximum price, had also allowed 
Remington to choose whatever price duration Remington wanted, 
and Remington had then refused to continue with the contract, the 
court might have found a breach by Remington.  Cardozo says the 
court need not resolve whether or not this theory of liability is 
tenable, because Sun Printing did not take that position.  “Instead, it 
gave its own construction to the contract, fixed for itself the length of 
the successive terms, and thereby coupled its demand with a 
condition which there was no duty to accept.”75 
C.  Judge Crane’s Dissent 
Whereas Cardozo opens his opinion by focusing on the nature 
of the missing terms, Judge Crane begins his dissent by stressing the 
parties’ intentions concerning the contract as a whole.  He states: 
“The parties to this transaction beyond question thought they were 
making a contract for the purchase and sale of 16,000 tons rolls news 
print.”76  In the next sentence, Crane flips Cardozo’s concern that the 
contract (under the option interpretation) placed the seller at the 
mercy of the buyer to contend, instead, that allowing the seller to 
escape the contract would establish a means for the seller to take 
unfair advantage of the buyer.  As Crane puts it, based on an 
allegation in the Complaint: “The contract was upon a form used by 
 
74 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471-72. 
75 Id. at 472. Here Cardozo gives his last case citation, to one of his early opinions, 
Rubber Trading Co. v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 116 N.E 789 (N.Y. 1917). In Rubber 
Trading, Cardozo held that the seller of rubber, in tendering the rubber to the buyer, imposed 
a condition that the buyer had to stipulate that the rubber was of satisfactory quality before 
the seller would complete delivery. The court found that this condition was not stated in or 
implied by the contract and therefore the buyer was permitted to respond by rejecting the 
rubber without consequence.  Rubber Trading Co., 116 N.E. at 889. Cardozo’s point in 
citing Rubber Trading seems to be that the buyer in Sun Printing did not merely state its 
willingness to pay the maximum price, which the contract permitted, but in addition 
conditioned this willingness on the seller’s acquiescence in a monthly price duration term, 
which the contract did not permit. In his statement of the facts, however, Cardozo does not 
indicate that the buyer conditioned its demand to get the paper at the maximum price on the 
seller’s acceptance of a monthly price term. Rather, Cardozo simply states that the buyer 
renewed its demand each month, with no response from the seller. Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 
470. 
76 Id. at 472 (Crane, J., dissenting). 
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the defendant in its business, and we must suppose that it was 
intended to be what it states to be, and not a trick or device to defraud 
merchants.”77  
After providing more detail about the terms of the contract 
than Cardozo offers, Crane expands on his initial points: 
Surely these parties must have had in mind that some 
binding agreement was made for the sale and delivery 
of 16,000 tons rolls of paper, and that the instrument 
contained all the elements necessary to make a binding 
contract. It is a strain upon reason to imagine the paper 
house, the Remington Paper & Power Company, 
Incorporated, and the Sun Printing & Publishing 
Association, formally executing a contract drawn up 
upon the defendant’s prepared form which was useless 
and amounted to nothing. We must, at least, start the 
examination of this agreement by believing that these 
intelligent parties intended to make a binding contract. 
If this be so, the court should spell out a binding 
contract, if it be possible. I not only think it possible, 
but think the paper itself clearly states a contract 
recognized under all the rules at law.78  
Crane’s reasoning is that these sophisticated businesses would not 
have gone to such effort to write such a detailed and formally 
executed document if they did not intend it to be enforceable. He 
believes the court should support this intent rather than deny 
enforcement to encourage the parties to write more definite contracts. 
Crane then turns to the two open terms, starting with the price 
term.  In contrast to Cardozo’s tentative suggestion that if only the 
price term had been left open the court might have been willing to fill 
it in, Crane expresses no hesitation in concluding that if the buyer 
was willing to pay the maximum price, the price term was 
sufficiently definite to be enforced.  In fact, Crane finds that this 
conclusion “seems to be very clear.”79  With respect to Cardozo’s 
concern that the price duration term was left open, Crane responds 
that “there are many answers to this.”80  
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 472-73. 
79 Id. at 473. 
80 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473. (Crane, J., dissenting). 
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Crane then proceeds to offer four possible ways of filling in 
the gap, the first two of which are the ones Cardozo discusses in his 
opinion,81 and none of which had been suggested by Sun Printing in 
its brief.  First, the Canadian Export price on December 15th, 1919 
could be the price for the remainder of the contract (the single option 
theory).  Crane here suggests that the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price might have been stable for the entire year, a 
conjecture Cardozo counters as not asserted or proven by the buyer.  
Second, the price duration could be monthly, with the buyer able to 
agree to pay the Canadian Export Paper Company price on the 
fifteenth of each successive month.  Cardozo parries this proposal 
with his critique that it would create a “dozen options” and the seller 
would “never know where it stood.”  Crane’s third suggestion – and 
one to which we will return in a subsequent section – is that the price 
duration could be the price duration in the Canadian Export Paper 
Company contracts.  Cardozo ignores this suggestion except to the 
extent it is implicitly covered by his critique of the multiple option 
interpretation.  Finally, Crane maintains that as a last resort, the court 
should “apply the rule of reason and compel parties to contract in the 
light of fair dealing” by determining a price duration period that “is 
reasonable under all the circumstances and conditions as applied in 
the paper trade.”82  Cardozo implicitly responds to this suggestion 
with his statement that the seller “did not undertake to conform to the 
practice and beliefs of others.” 
Crane concludes his dissent by contending that any one of his 
four solutions would lead to a “practical and just result”; therefore, 
 
81 Before turning to the four possibilities, Crane for a third time reiterates: “We have 
reason to believe that the parties supposed they were making a binding contract[; thus,] . . . 
the court should be very reluctant to permit a defendant to avoid its contract.” Id. (Crane, J., 
dissenting).  Interestingly, this statement of the parties’ intent and Crane’s confidence in 
ascertaining it is more tentative than the first two statements, which asserted that the parties’ 
contractual intent was “beyond question” and something the parties must “surely . . . have 
had in mind.” Id. at 472. In support of the last phrase quoted about the court’s reluctance to 
permit contract avoidance, Crane cites the first case in his dissent, Wakeman v. Wheeler & 
Wilson Mfg. Co., 4 N.E. 264 (N.Y. 1886). The citation is odd because Wakeman is a case 
about whether damages are too uncertain to be awarded, not whether a contract’s terms are 
too indefinite to be enforced, but one could argue the doctrines are analogous. Crane cited 
Wakeman because of the following statement in that opinion: “A person violating his 
contract should not be permitted entirely to escape liability because the amount of the 
damages which he has caused is uncertain.” Wakeman, 4 N.E. at 266. More generally, it is 
worth noting that Crane’s dissent does not cite any of the cases in Cardozo’s opinion; nor 
does Cardozo cite any of the cases in the dissent. 
82 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473 (Crane, J., dissenting). 
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allowing the seller to “escape from its formal obligations” would 
“give the sanction of law to a deliberate breach.”83  In support, Crane 
adds a string cite of three Cardozo opinions, including his well-
known opinion in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,84 though none of 
those cases involved a claim of indefiniteness or explicitly referenced 
“deliberate breach.”85 
D. Remand and Cardozo’s Subsequent (But Not Second)        
Thoughts 
On remand, Sun Printing, the buyer, amended its complaint to 
allege that the default price duration should be quarterly periods, a 
solution not suggested by Judge Crane in his dissent.  The trial court, 
finding that the buyer’s allegation did not remove the contract’s 
indefiniteness, dismissed the complaint.86  This time, the Appellate 
Division affirmed the trial court without opinion.87  In response to a 
subsequent motion for a leave to appeal, Cardozo initially wrote a 
memorandum supporting the granting of the motion: 
The amount involved is very large, over a million, five 
 
83 Id. 
84 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
85 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 473.  Wood involved the granting of an exclusive agency to a 
fashion promoter in an agreement that did not expressly impose any duties on the agent.  
Cardozo held (with Crane dissenting, interestingly) that there was an implied obligation on 
the part of the agent to exercise “reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into 
existence.” Wood, 118 N.E. at 215.  Unlike Sun Printing, Wood was argued on a theory of 
lack of mutuality of obligation and consideration; that is, Lady Duff-Gordon argued that she 
got nothing in return for her promise to Wood, the agent, because he made no return 
promise.  Although the Wood opinion says nothing about a “deliberate breach,” it does show 
Cardozo’s willingness to read terms into contracts and to reject an outdated “formalism” in 
which “every slip [is] fatal.” Id. at 214.  In the second Cardozo case cited by Crane (and the 
only one of the cases Crane cites that Sun Printing discussed in its brief), Moran v. Standard 
Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914), Cardozo held that an employment contract under which 
the employee agreed to sell paint on the employer’s behalf for five years on a commission 
basis was not terminable by the employer at will, but rather implied an agreement to employ 
the agent for five years.  Cardozo expressed a hesitation to infer an intention to create “so 
one-sided an agreement,” as the employer was contending for, especially when the document 
was drafted by the employer’s lawyers, who could easily have drafted an express at will 
termination provision. Id. at 220. Crane was not making any of these points; thus, his citation 
is somewhat puzzling.  The final case, United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 128 N.E. 123 
(N.Y. 1920) involved the interpretation of an ambiguously worded guaranty.  Its relevance to 
Sun Printing is not clear. 
86 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 323 (First Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed., 2000). 
87 Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 206 N.Y.S. 966 
(App. Div. 1924). 
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hundred thousand dollars [the total amounts of 
damages alleged by Sun Printing in its Complaint]. 
The defendant is trying to squirm out of a contract on 
very technical grounds. We sustained its position, 
though with avowed reluctance. If there is any 
reasonable way of holding this complaint good, I am 
sure we shall be glad to take advantage of it.88 
After receiving the seller’s brief, however, Cardozo changed 
his mind, concluding that the chances of reversal were “negligible” 
and recommending denial of the motion.89  The other Court of 
Appeals judges concurred in Cardozo’s assessment. 
Around the same time, Cardozo revisited Sun Printing in The 
Growth of the Law, based on lectures he gave at Yale Law School as 
a sequel to The Nature of the Judicial Process, also based on lectures 
he had given at Yale Law School several years earlier.  Cardozo 
opened his last lecture with a discussion of Sun Printing as a 
counterbalance to case examples he had previously referenced that 
“stress the worth of change, the virtue of flexibility, as contrasted 
with the worth of certainty.”90  To Cardozo, Sun Printing was a case 
in which “certainty was founded to be the larger good when mobility 
was weighed against it.”91  Cardozo then revisited and elaborated on 
some of the themes of his previously published opinion: 
Here was a case where advantage had been taken of 
the strict letter of a contract to avoid an onerous 
engagement. Not inconceivably a sensitive conscience 
would have rejected such an outlet of escape. We 
thought this immaterial. The court subordinated the 
equity of a particular situation to the overmastering 
need of certainty in the transactions of commercial 
life. The end to be attained in the development of the 
 
88 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323.  The “avowed reluctance” is not evident in Cardozo’s 
opinion, however. 
89 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323 (quoting from Report in Sun Printing, CM, Box 2, 
Folder 2114 (motion 6, Jan. 19, 1925)). 
90 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 109.  The quotation at the beginning of this article represents 
Cardozo’s pro-flexibility views from one of the earlier lectures. 
91 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 109. After then summarizing the Sun Printing facts, Cardozo 
adds a footnote stating that “a different result may be reached if the omitted term is of 
subsidiary importance (1 Williston, Contracts, § 48), but ordinarily the price to be paid, if 
reserved for subsequent agreement, is to be ranked as fundamental.” CARDOZO, supra note 1, 
at 110 n.1. 
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law of contract is the supremacy, not of some 
hypothetical, imaginary will, apart from external 
manifestations, but of will outwardly revealed in the 
spoken or written word. The loss to business would in 
the long run be greater than the gain if judges were 
clothed with the power to revise as well as to interpret. 
Perhaps, with a higher conception of business and its 
needs, the time will come when even revision will be 
permitted if it is revision in consonance with 
established standards of fair dealing, but the time is 
not yet. In this department of activity, the current 
axiology still places stability and certainty in the 
forefront of the virtues.92 
Thus, Cardozo had no misgivings about his earlier opinion. 
II.  COMMENTARY ON SUN PRINTING  
A number of commentators, including some of the most 
prominent writers on contract law, have offered various critiques of 
Sun Printing over the years since its appearance.  A brief note on the 
case published in the year it was decided rejects the option theory but 
agrees with the dissent that the parties had agreed to make a binding 
contract.93  The note further argues that, given the monthly payment 
period specified in the contract, the court should have implied the 
Canadian Export Paper Company maximum price during the month 
of each shipment of paper, thus endorsing one of Judge Crane’s 
proposals.94  Fifteen years later, Arthur Corbin, in an article on 
Cardozo’s contracts cases, puzzled over Sun Printing in a footnote, 
calling the decision “somewhat surprising[]” and speculating that 
Cardozo may have been “less moved to cure defects in the work of 
the well-paid lawyers of two rich corporations.”95  Grant Gilmore 
 
92 CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 110-11 (footnote omitted). 
93 Case Note, Contracts – Construction – Agreements to Agree, 33 YALE L.J. 97, 98 
(1923). 
94 Id. (“Since shipments and payments were to be monthly, it seems that the adoption of 
the maximum price charged by the Canadian Export Company during the month of shipment 
offered a reasonable basis for giving operative effect to that intent.  Nor does any substantial 
reason appear for the court to refuse to apply to the determination of the period over which a 
price is to operate the rule of reasonableness which is regularly applied to fix prices or times 
for delivery.”). 
95 Arthur Linton Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J. 
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cited Corbin’s criticism of Sun Printing in The Death of Contract, 
and quipped that “Cardozo was not always a model of consistency.”96  
Judge Posner, in his book on Cardozo, notes Crane’s “powerful 
dissent” and speculates that Cardozo may have had political (in the 
broad sense) motivations for deciding Sun Printing the way he did.  
According to Posner: “Cardozo wanted to be an institutional leader 
and succeeded in this aim, in part, by avoiding the pose of an 
ostentatious liberal.”97 
Larry DiMatteo has provided the most detailed critique of 
Cardozo’s reasoning in Sun Printing, albeit in an article focused on 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.98  DiMatteo’s main point is that 
Cardozo, who generally favored contextual analysis in contract cases 
such as Wood, misapplied that analysis in Sun Printing.  First, 
DiMatteo notes that Cardozo was willing to consider some contextual 
evidence in Sun Printing.  Specifically, “Cardozo ventures outside 
the contract to note that market prices were on the rise in 1920.”99  
But, DiMatteo argues, Cardozo did not follow the implications of this 
contextual evidence.  He could have recognized that the rising market 
prices explained why the buyer agreed to a price maximum set at the 
“prime customer rate” and that if market prices rose higher than that 
prime rate, “the possibility for exploitation existed.”100  Instead, 
 
426, 428 n.1 (1938); 52 HARV. L. REV. 408, 410 n.1 (1938); 39 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 58 n.1 
(1938).  Corbin contrasts Sun Printing with several other cases that in his view demonstrated 
Cardozo’s “clear genius in his filling of gaps, his finding of promises by implication where 
none was put into clear words, his discovery and enforcement of the directing purpose for 
which a contract was made, not permitting that purpose to fail by reason of vagueness in 
details.” 48 YALE L.J. at 427, 52 HARV. L. REV. at 409, 39 COLUM. L. REV. at 57. These 
cases include Cohen & Sons, distinguished by Cardozo in his opinion, see supra note 51, and 
Moran and Wood, cited by the dissent, see supra note 85. 
96 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 144 n.137 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1998). 
97 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 121 (Univ. of Chicago ed., 
1990).  Cardozo’s eagerness to provide a counterbalance to his general support of judicial 
flexibility in The Growth of the Law. CARDOZO, supra note 1, provides some support for 
Posner’s view. 
98 Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism, 
28 PACE L. REV. 315 (2008). 
99 Id. at 338.  Cardozo’s observation may go outside the contract, but it does not go 
outside the record. Sun Printing noted the increase in prices in its complaint.  See Complaint, 
supra note 11.  In paraphrasing Cardozo’s opinion on this point, DiMatteo takes a small, but 
important, liberty. Cardozo says that market prices “happened to rise.”  That suggests 
Cardozo was looking at the matter solely from the ex post perspective of what actually 
happened rather than what the parties expected ex ante at the time of contracting, which is 
what DiMatteo is suggesting, as evidenced by his subsequent analysis.  Nevertheless, I agree 
with DiMatteo’s view for reasons discussed in the next section. 
100 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338.  DiMatteo does not explain what he means by the 
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Cardozo turned to the disadvantage to the seller if market prices had 
fallen, to which DiMatteo’s response is, “why is this a bad thing?”101 
Second, DiMatteo criticizes Cardozo’s argument that the 
omission of a price duration term as well as a price term made the 
contract nothing more than an “agreement to agree” as “strained 
logic.”  DiMatteo argues that Cardozo could have based the price 
duration on the price durations for the first several months of the 
contract (more of a structural argument than a contextual argument) 
and found that the contract implied either a monthly or quarterly 
price duration.102  Lastly, DiMatteo attacks Cardozo’s refusal to read 
into the contract a reasonable term as inconsistent with his ready use 
of a “contextual inquiry into business practice” to impose a 
reasonable efforts requirement in Wood. DiMatteo criticizes 
Cardozo’s willingness to blame the buyer for unilaterally insisting on 
the appropriate price duration term as 
not a rational argument given the fact that the buyer 
had set the new price at the maximum price allowed 
by the contract, that the unexpired portion of the 
contract was a modest twelve months, and that the 
seller’s response to the buyer’s attempt to set the price 
and duration of the price change was to reject any 
obligation under the contract.103  
Despite his sharp criticism of Cardozo’s opinion, DiMatteo 
(perhaps halfheartedly) nevertheless defends it on the basis of 
Cardozo’s alternative rationale that the decision would “stimulate 
certainty in legal rules and business transactions.”104  According to 
 
“possibility for exploitation,” but I assume he means that the seller would unreasonably try 
to escape its contractual obligations, which in fact happened. 
101 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338.  DiMatteo does not consider the possibilities that a 
market price decline might be a “bad thing” if it was not anticipated by the parties or if for 
some reason the maximum fell below the seller’s production costs. 
102 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338.  DiMatteo adds that this interpretation would be 
“especially reasonable given that a price source was accessible” and “the buyer was willing 
to pay the maximum contract price as represented by that price source.”  DiMatteo, supra 
note 98, at 338-39.  But DiMatteo does not explain how the “price source” would solve 
Cardozo’s price duration concern.  It may be that he is implicitly endorsing Judge Crane’s 
suggestion that the applicable price duration could be the duration of the contracts of the 
Canadian Export Paper Company, a suggestion I take up in the next section. 
103 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 339 (footnote omitted). 
104 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 340 (adding that, despite his attempt, “[i]t is difficult to 
reconcile Cardozo’s opinion in Sun Printing with Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, and the cases 
cited by Justice Crane. . . .”). 
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DiMatteo: “Without some limits to the contextual manipulation of 
material terms, parties would intentionally leave gaps in their 
contracts,” which “would encourage speculation and exploitation in 
future commercial transactions.”105 
Several other commentators have offered support for 
Cardozo’s view.  With ambivalence similar to DiMatteo’s, Karl 
Llewellyn, though he criticizes the Sun Printing opinion as “labored 
and unsatisfactory” as well as a “bothering step backward,”106 blames 
the buyer’s lawyers rather than Cardozo for the outcome because the 
lawyers’ “bad pleadings” failed to provide the relevant commercial or 
contextual reading of the contract.107  Charles Brower and Randy 
Barnett, responding to Crane’s dissent, contend that the fact that 
Crane was able to come up with so many alternative ways for the 
court to fill the gap actually proves Cardozo’s point, which was that 
the court had no basis for choosing from among the various 
possibilities the one that best represented the parties’ intent.108  Curtis 
Bridgeman sees Sun Printing as an example of Cardozo’s willingness 
to adhere to formalism in that “Cardozo considered himself bound to 
the formal rules of contract even in some cases where they seemed to 
 
105 DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 340. 
106 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 242 (1960). 
107 Id. at 242 n.243.  See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in 
Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1393 n.72 (1995) (noting that Sun Printing is best 
viewed as a “pleadings case” in that, unlike the dissent, Cardozo was not willing to “assume 
facts about a particular commodity market” but demanded that the plaintiff buyer plead those 
facts); KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 322 (arguing that Cardozo’s “position was quite 
straightforward”: he found an “important gap in the terms of the agreement” and the 
“plaintiff had produced no evidence of business usage that would fill the gap,” a “defect” 
that “was fatal”).  But see DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 339 (criticizing Cardozo’s statements 
concerning the uncertainty in the record about whether the Canadian Export Paper Company 
price was fluctuating as “retreat[ing] into the nuance of unsubstantiated facts”). 
108 Charles H. Brower II, Mind the Gap, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11.  In Brower’s words: 
While appealing in some respects, the menu of options presented by 
Judge Crane simply reinforced Cardozo’s main point.  In the absence of 
any contractual basis, the court had no disciplined basis on which to 
supply the omitted term.  Although the court might choose any number 
of solutions, each one might produce vastly different economic 
consequences in a rising market, none of which may have laid within the 
contemplation of the parties.  In other words, the court would be pulling 
numbers out of thin air, and that did not constitute a judicial act. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS 98 (2010) (“Crane’s ability to 
articulate numerous different ways of filling in the gap unintentionally supported Cardozo’s 
conclusion that this contract was too indefinite to be enforced.”). 
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give an unjust, or at least unhappy, result.”109  Focusing on Cardozo’s 
argument that enforcing the contract would put the seller at the mercy 
of the buyer, Lawrence Cunningham justifies the decision as an 
example of Cardozo’s desire to deter opportunistic behavior by 
contracting parties.110 
Perhaps most notably, Andrew Kaufman, in his majestic 
biography of Cardozo, defends Sun Printing on the ground that 
parties who write defectively incomplete contracts should bear the 
consequences.  Kaufman writes: 
Cardozo certainly believed in creative interpretation of 
the language of business contracts to comport with the 
commercial background. He was not willing, though, 
to push interpretation to the point where it appeared to 
him to be revision of a contract that was invalid as 
written. He would not manipulate the rules of contract 
interpretation to do justice on an individual case 
basis. . . . Cardozo’s bottom line in Sun Printing was 
that there were areas of commercial dealing where the 
parties either by design or accident did not reach 
binding agreements, and in those areas they took their 
chances. . . . Cardozo’s opinion reflected one of his 
 
109 Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and 
Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 184-85 (2005). 
110 Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394-95.  Cunningham argues: 
If the writing were taken to mean that the buyer had agreed to pay the 
specified ceiling price, the seller would have been “at the mercy of the 
buyer” with respect to the duration of that price.  For example, the buyer 
could have insisted on paying the ceiling price for so long as it was 
favorable, and when it became unfavorable, the buyer could then have 
refused to do so.  In short, under the contract as written, the seller had no 
basis for knowing the duration of the price. Thus, while it would be 
correct to understand Cardozo’s decision in Sun Printing as a refusal to 
make contracts for the parties and therefore to embrace the principle of 
freedom of contract, the case warrants a finer reading.  It also reflects an 
unwillingness to countenance exploitive terms to which the parties 
would most likely not have agreed. 
Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394-95 (footnotes omitted). In Cunningham’s view, the 
anti-opportunism approach (i.e., an approach that avoids interpretations that would put one 
contracting party “at the mercy” of the other) unifies Cardozo’s decisions in Sun Printing 
and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1393-97. 
DiMatteo challenges Cunningham’s mercy argument, contending that in Sun Printing, unlike 
Wood, “[i]njustice was not prevented, but was incurred with the non-enforcement of the 
contract.”  DiMatteo, supra note 98, at 338. 
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major instincts – that life, particularly life in modern 
industrial society, was risky, and that acceptance of a 
large measure of risk was a necessary cost attending 
the rewards.  In contracts, as in torts, the law offered 
some protection, but only so much. There were times 
when people and businesses had to look out for 
themselves.111 
Other commentators, rather than agreeing or disagreeing with 
Sun Printing, use the case to illustrate broader points about 
contracting or contract law or theory.  Stewart Macaulay, in his 
classic article on non-contractual relations in business, references Sun 
Printing (without citing it by name) as an example of the irrelevance 
of contract law by arguing that the case has had no effect on either 
contracts in the industry or on business behavior more generally.112  
Randy Barnett sees the case as representing a conflict over whether 
more than intention to be legally bound is necessary for a contract to 
be enforceable, with Crane taking the position that intent to be legally 
bound is sufficient and Cardozo taking the position that “more than 
this is required for an enforceable contract to exist.”113  Specifically, 
Cardozo’s view is that if “the parties have failed to make their own 
private law for the courts to enforce,” they “should be free from 
having terms to which they did not consent imposed on them by a 
court.”114 
Several commentators use Sun Printing as a vehicle for 
discussing the possibility of “cure by concession” as a solution                         
 
111 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323-24. 
112 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 60 (1963) (“The standard contract used by manufacturers of paper to sell 
to magazine publishers has a pricing clause which is probably sufficiently vague to make the 
contract legally unenforceable.  The house counsel of one of the largest paper producers [in 
Wisconsin] said that everyone in the industry is aware of this because of a leading New York 
case concerning the contract, but that no one cares”). See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 3.29, p. 213 n.11 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting this passage and stating that it refers 
to Sun Printing); see also KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 323. Professor Kaufman reads 
Macaulay’s statement as a “practical confirmation” of Cardozo’s position because it shows 
that “[b]uyers and sellers in that industry have apparently decided to gain flexibility by 
leaving some uncertainty in their dealings.” An alternative interpretation of Macaulay’s 
description is that contracting parties in the newsprint industry are willing to live with the 
Sun Printing rule, not that they prefer it.  It is just not worth it to them to contract around it 
because specifying a more definite price is costly and, in most cases, they work things out. 
113 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 871 (1992). 
114 Id. 
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to indefinite contracts.  Omri Ben-Shahar describes this approach, 
which he reframes as a “no-retraction principle,” as follows: “The 
party who seeks enforcement of the incomplete agreement is granted 
an option to enforce the transaction supplemented with terms that are 
the most favorable (within reason) to the other party.”115  Unlike a 
“majoritarian” approach to contractual gap-filling, which “imposes” 
terms on contracting parties, under the cure by concession view, “the 
missing terms must be such that the completed deal is guaranteed to 
be no worse than what the retracting party could have presumptively 
intended when the incomplete promise was made, and it is enforced 
only if the promisee so chooses.”116  Ben-Shahar then argues that 
Cardozo seemed willing to adopt this approach in Sun Printing, but 
Cardozo declined to do so because the contract omitted price 
duration, as well as price, and the buyer did not concede to accept the 
price duration term most favorable to the seller.117 
Finally, several commentators suggest that the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reject 
the rationale of Sun Printing and would dictate a different result if the 
case were to be decided today.118  In fact, it is quite possible that 
 
115 Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual 
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1862 (2004). 
116 Id. at 1863. 
117 Professors Farnsworth and Barnett offer variations on this theme.  Farnsworth, in his 
treatise, states: “On the court’s own reasoning, had the buyer offered to pay the highest price 
for the month of delivery or any preceding month during the period subject to agreement, 
instead of merely offering to pay the Canadian price for the month of delivery, there would 
appear no reason to refuse to enforce the agreement.”  FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at  § 
3.29, p. 213. It is not clear why Farnsworth refers to the “preceding” month rather than 
“succeeding” months, or why he focuses on the “highest price for the month” rather than the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price at the time of renewal.  Barnett suggests that the 
buyer might have prevailed if it had “committed itself to pay for the duration of the 
agreement any monthly increases in the Canadian standard price, and continued to pay the 
increased price even if the Canadian standard price later fell.”  Barnett, supra note 113, at 
869. It is not clear why Barnett believes the buyer should have had to commit itself to the 
highest Canadian Export Paper Company price even if that price later fell.  The ambiguity in 
how to apply the “cure by concession” approach, represented by these two versions, may 
suggest difficulties in adopting this approach. 
118 See Barnett, supra note 113, at 870 (“Today, of course, courts would likely reach a 
different outcome by interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to fill the price 
term gap.”); see Cunningham, supra note 107, at 1394 n.76, 1407  (“While the dissent’s 
approach in Sun Printing was resisted at common law, it has been expressly sanctioned by 
the U.C.C.”) (stating that “the received understanding of Sun Printing – holding that a 
contract that does not fix a price term is unenforceable – [was] reversed by section 2-305 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code”); see also Daniel P. O’Gorman, The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts’ Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement: A Model of Neoclassical Contract 
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Cardozo could have reached the same result were he to be deciding 
the case today.  UCC § 2-305(1)(b) states:  
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract 
for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a 
case the price is a reasonable price at the time for 
delivery if . . . the price is left to be agreed by the 
parties and they fail to agree. 
Comment 1 to that section adds that if the requirements of 
UCC § 2-305 are met, the UCC “rejects . . . the formula that ‘an 
agreement to agree is unenforceable.’”  On the other hand, UCC § 2-
305(4) states: “Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound 
unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there 
is no contract.”  Thus, the key question is what the parties intended to 
happen if they could not reach agreement. Although Cardozo is 
somewhat ambiguous on this point, one could read him to be saying 
that the parties intended not to be bound unless they agreed on price 
and price duration.  More important, UCC § 2-305 addresses only an 
“Open Price Term.”  It says nothing about price duration, which 
Cardozo viewed as a separate term (though one obviously intertwined 
with the price term).119  If § 2-305 does not apply, the UCC’s general 
gap-filling provision, § 2-204(3) would apply.  That section states: 
“Even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale 
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a 
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy.”120  Under that language, Cardozo would seem 
 
Law and a Model of Confusion and Inconsistency, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 169, 236 n.388 
(2014) (stating that Restatement (Second) § 204 cmt. d and UCC § 2-305 both reject the 
rationale in Sun Printing). 
119 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 112, at § 3.29, p. 213 n.11 (“Since the court [in Sun 
Printing] viewed the indefiniteness as one of time as well as price, U.C.C. § 2-305 does not 
compel a different result.”). 
120 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2016).  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 is similar to U.C.C. 
§ 2-204(3).  It states: 
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood 
as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the 
terms of the contract are reasonably certain. 
(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis 
for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate 
remedy. 
(3) The fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or 
uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to 
be understood as an offer or as an acceptance. 
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to have ample room to reach the same result he did in Sun Printing.  
One could easily imagine Cardozo deciding both that the parties did 
not “intend to make a contract” absent agreement on the price and 
price duration terms, and that in any case, there was no principled 
basis for determining a remedy. 
III.  THE CONTEXT OF SUN PRINTING  
As Cardozo presents the case, Sun Printing appears to involve 
a garden variety commercial contract between two large entities 
concerning a standardized good in a thick market.  Thus, the case 
seems like a paradigmatic example of the type of “A vs. B” 
abstraction common in Restatement illustrations and other types of 
legal analysis.  Limited by the information provided by the buyer in 
its complaint, Cardozo offers no hint as to who the parties are, the 
circumstances surrounding their agreement, why they might have 
chosen to structure the deal the way they did, or why the seller was 
dissatisfied with the contract.  Suppose, however, that we dig a little 
deeper.  What would we find? And does it matter?121 
A.  Background to the Contract 
Sun Printing & Publishing Association published the New 
York Sun, which at the time the case arose was one of the leading 
urban newspapers in the country, with both daily and Sunday 
editions.  It was best known for having declared, “Yes, Virginia, 
there is a Santa Claus” in 1897 (and repeatedly thereafter).122  The 
Sun was “widely read by well-off people” and had initially withheld 
its endorsement from Cardozo when he ran for judge of the New 
York Supreme Court in 1913, though it did wind up endorsing him 
shortly before the election.123 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). 
121 In his philosophical writings, Cardozo argued that contextual facts should matter in 
business cases. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 124-25 (“Often the question before the court 
is concerned with the rule that is to regulate some business enterprise or transaction.  The 
facts of economic and business life are then relevant considerations.”). 
122 National Endowment for the Humanities, Chronicling America: Historic American 
Newspapers, LIBR. OF CONG., http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030272/ (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
123 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 122.  Kaufman does not suggest that Cardozo harbored 
any ill will toward the Sun at the time, or later, and in any case the idea that Cardozo would 
base his decision on any personal animus toward Sun Printing is wholly inconsistent with the 
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Remington Paper & Power Company, headquartered in 
Watertown, New York, and originally founded in 1865,124 was a 
large manufacturer of paper, including newsprint.  In 1916, 
Remington was the fifth largest producer of newsprint paper in the 
United States and the eleventh largest in the U.S. and Canada 
combined.125  In that year, Remington produced 49,426 tons of 
paper,126 and in 1920, Remington’s daily tonnage was 156 (56,940 
per year),127 which means that the 12,000-ton annual quantity stated 
in the contract was a significant portion (more than 20%) of 
Remington’s annual production. 
The manufacture of newsprint paper from wood pulp began    
in the 1860s.128 By the time of the contract, the market                                  
had grown significantly. The newsprint market was somewhat 
segmented. There were the large daily newspapers, of which the         
New York Sun was one. There were a larger number of smaller                     
daily newspapers. And there were weekly newspapers. The daily 
newspapers tended to buy their newsprint through contracts,129 with 
the larger dailies dealing directly with the manufacturers and the 
smaller dailies contracting through middlemen (jobbers).  The weekly 
newspapers generally bought newsprint in the open (spot) market.130 
In the years preceding the contract, the newsprint paper 
industry had undergone significant turmoil.  Between 1910 and 1915, 
competition in the industry had increased significantly, as a number 
of new Canadian mills sprang up and older mills added newer, more 
efficient machines. These Canadian mills, which exported most of 
their newsprint to the Unites States,131 had several advantages over 
 
picture Kaufman paints of him in the book. 
124 See Howard J. Palmer, The History of Paper Making in Northern New York, Paper: A 
Weekly Technical Journal for Paper and Pulp Mills, at 15-16 (Mar. 16, 1921).  The 
company was organized by Alfred D. Remington, son of Illustrious Remington, who had 
founded his first mill in Watertown along with Alfred in 1854. 
125 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE NEWS-PRINT PAPER INDUSTRY 33 (1917) 
[hereinafter “FTC 1917 Report”].  Remington’s share of the U.S. production was 3.6% and 
its share of the US and Canadian production was 2.5%. Id. Remington operated three 
newsprint mills containing five paper machines.  Id. at 35. 
126 Id. at 33. 
127 Newsprint Paper Industry: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Mfrs. U.S. 
Sen., 66th Cong. 508-09 (1920) [hereinafter “Senate Subcommittee Hearings”]. 
128 Id. at 441. 
129 Id. at 473 (“About 90 per cent of the total shipments of news-print paper is sold under 
contract.”). 
130 Id. at 118. 
131 Id. at 114. By 1916, Canada furnished about 30% of all the newsprint used in the 
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their American counterparts, including access to cheap wood and 
cheap water power.132  In addition, in 1911 the U.S. removed tariff 
duties from imports of newsprint from Canadian companies.  As a 
result, Canadian manufacturers could sell newsprint for an average of 
$.225 per 100 lbs. ($4.50/ton) less than American manufacturers.133  
The increase in the number of Canadian mills, as well as their price 
advantage, led to declining prices for newsprint and gave newspaper 
publishers a market advantage, which they used to secure favorable 
contract terms, including flexible quantity terms134 and terms 
requiring manufacturers to pay for shipping costs.135 
In 1916, the newsprint market become more favorable to 
manufacturers, as prices began to increase and manufacturers were 
able to negotiate better contract terms with the large newspaper 
publishers.136  In part, this shift resulted from the increased demand 
for newsprint, as businesses sought more advertising in newspapers 
to reduce their corporate income taxes and the general public 
hungered for news of World War I, both of which increased the 
length of newspapers.137  Demand by foreign buyers also increased 
because of a shortage of paper in foreign markets.138  Demand for 
non-newsprint paper also increased, and manufacturers shifted some 
production away from newsprint to more profitable types of paper.139  
The manufacturers claimed they could not meet all of this higher 
demand with existing mill capacity.140  In addition, manufacturers 
faced higher production costs, such as a shortage of coal supplies.141  
A final factor was that in April 1915, the newsprint paper 
 
United States. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 45. 
132 E.O. Merchant, The Government and the News-Print Paper Manufacturers, 32 Q. J. 
ECON. 238, 240 (1918) [hereinafter “Merchant I”]. 
133 Id.; see also FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 45. 
134 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 56 (stating that before 1917, it was common to 
have quantity terms that included some flexibility, such as a maximum and minimum or a 
stated quantity with a stated percentage deviation allowance). 
135 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 240-41. 
136 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 132. 
137 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 241; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 132; S. REP. 
NO. 662, at 3 (1920) [hereinafter “Senate 1920 Report”]. 
138 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242. 
139 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242; Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 3. 
140 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 242; but see FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 134 
(“While there was approximately enough paper to go around, publishers were fearful that 
they could not get their supply.”). 
141 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 243. 
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manufacturers had decided to form the News-Print Manufacturers 
Association, in hopes of improving conditions for the mills.142  
Remington was a member of the Association.  Another member of 
the Association was the Canadian Export Paper Company, which was 
formed in 1916 to pool the export business of, and act as agent for, 
five of the biggest Canadian companies representing one-third of 
Canadian output of newsprint paper.143 The activity of the 
Association may also have artificially restricted newsprint output and 
contributed to the price increases of 1916.144 
The large daily newspapers, which bought most of the 
newsprint, enjoyed more favorable prices and terms than the               
smaller purchasers, which often purchased their newsprint through 
intermediaries (jobbers). The larger publishers, some of which 
purchased 100 tons of newsprint per day, typically had year-long 
contracts generally corresponding with the calendar year, while                
the smaller publishers purchased their newsprint in the more                   
expensive spot market.145   As a result of their advantages, many of 
the publishers of the large daily newspapers “did not feel the effects 
of the rising prices until the end of 1916, when their favorable 
contracts expired.”146  In the 1917 contracts, many manufacturers 
switched to “f.o.b. mill” pricing, meaning the publishers had to pay 
for transportation. In addition, the manufacturers eliminated the 
previously existing flexibility publishers had enjoyed on quantity.147 
Meanwhile, in response to complaints by the publishers, the 
federal antitrust regulators got involved.  At the request of Congress, 
the Federal Trade Commission began an investigation.  A report by 
the FTC “found that prices had been increased in the year 1917 more 
than could be justified by increased cost” and “that the increase had 
 
142 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 238; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 40. 
143 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 42.  According to testimony before the Senate 
Subcommittee by Alva Snyder, an examiner for the FTC, George F. Steele, the secretary of 
the Newsprint Manufacturers’ Association, had advocated the formation of the Canadian 
Export Paper Company after the FTC and Attorney General’s investigations had started. See 
Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, part 2, at 121. 
144 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 239; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 41-42, 132; 
Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 3. 
145 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 240; FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48, 132. 
146 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 243. 
147 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 56; see also Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, 
at 1 (noting the shift from f.o.b. destination pricing to f.o.b. mill pricing by the end of 1916, 
as well as a “strict rule against allowing leeway in tonnage to the buyer, who was compelled 
to take his allotment monthly whether he needed it or not”). 
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been due, in part, to the restriction of competition by important 
manufacturers in Canada and the United States.”148  More 
specifically, the FTC uncovered evidence that the newsprint 
manufacturers, acting through their Association, had tacitly agreed 
not to interfere with one another’s customers, restricted production, 
and prevented or discouraged the building of new mills.149  Based on 
this evidence, the Department of Justice brought a criminal antitrust 
action against seven newsprint manufacturers (not including 
Remington), five of whom pleaded nolo contendere and agreed to 
price regulation by the Federal Trade Commission for the duration of 
the war and three months thereafter.150  In response to a subsequent 
proceeding by the Department of Justice, the newsprint 
manufacturers (including Remington) agreed to disband the 
Association,151 though the FTC agreed to collect and publish industry 
data.152  The former secretary of the Association, George F. Steele, 
became the general manager of the Canadian Export Paper Co.153 
In 1918, the newsprint manufacturers that had settled with the 
Department of Justice and the publishers fought in various 
proceedings over the price set by the FTC. The manufacturers 
succeeded in getting the FTC to raise the regulated price, and the 
publishers’ attempt to get the FTC or the courts to reopen the case 
failed. The resulting price for the second half of 1918, $3.7525 per 
100 pounds, was, in the words of one economist, “a complete victory 
for the manufacturers,” because they “succeeded in getting a price for 
their product at least as high if not higher than they would have 
obtained if there had been no proceedings of any kind.”154  Reaching 
a similar conclusion, but under a different rationale, a Senate Report 
in 1920 concluded that the newsprint manufacturers had effected a 
“virtual nullification of the law”155 by exploiting a provision in the 
FTC settlement allowing manufacturers to receive higher prices than 
the regulated price under the settlement, provided that the price was 
 
148 J.A. Guthrie, Price Regulation in the Paper Industry, 60 Q. J. ECON. 194, 198 (1946). 
149 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 248. 
150 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 249. 
151 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 250. 
152 Merchant I, supra note 132, at 253. 
153 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 121 (testimony of Alva Snyder, 
examiner for the FTC). 
154 E. O. Merchant, The Government and the News-Print Paper Manufacturers, 34 Q. J. 
ECON. 313, 327 (1920) [hereinafter “Merchant II”]. 
155 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 4. 
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satisfactory to the publisher.156 
That brings us to the summer of 1919, the time of the Sun 
Printing agreement.  At that time, World War I had been over for less 
than a year.  In addition, the FTC price regulation regime had ended. 
What were the prospects for the future of the newsprint market at that 
time?  Concerns about high and rising prices in the newsprint 
industry remained.  As with the price increase in 1916, the causes of 
concern were some combination of market conditions leading to a 
shortage of newsprint and anticompetitive practices by newsprint 
manufacturers.  On the market condition side, one economist 
published an article in February 1920 (thus likely written in the fall of 
1919), which stated: 
Government investigations and price fixing during the 
war undoubtedly tended to discourage and retard the 
expansion of the industry. This was particularly true of 
the prices fixed by the Canadian government, which 
were somewhat lower than those established in the 
United States. During recent months the revival of 
business and the excess profits tax have stimulated 
such a volume of advertising and consequently such a 
demand for print paper that the capacity of existing 
mills has been entirely inadequate to cope with the 
situation. As a result we are now witnessing a paper 
shortage and famine prices which eclipse anything that 
occurred during the war.157 
Another economist, writing several decades later in 1946, 
suggested that anticompetitive practices may have continued during 
 
156 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 433-36.  In fact, the Canadian 
Export Paper Company included such a “waiver” in its 1919 and 1920 contracts. “The seller 
has offered to sell and deliver paper to the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of an 
agreement between the Attorney General of the United States as trustee, and various 
manufacturers of newsprint paper, . . . and this contract is made with full knowledge on the 
part of the purchaser of the provisions of said agreement, and the purchaser hereby waives 
the benefit of any and all provisions of said agreement and represents that it prefers to make 
this contract regardless of the provisions of said agreement, and that in entering into this 
contract is acting in its own interest.” Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 
431. 
157 Merchant II, supra note 154, at 328.  In addition to the Government war restrictions 
mentioned by Merchant, the War Industries Board also apparently regulated the size of 
newspapers to conserve on paper.  See Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 
112 (Testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business Manager of the Washington D.C. Evening 
Star).  Removing those regulations would also predictably lead to a greater use of newsprint. 
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this time: “A rise in prices caused by increased demand and reduced 
supply of paper of all kinds during World War I provided a favorable 
opportunity for restraint and suppression of price competition in 
several branches of the industry.”158  Moreover: “During World War I 
and for a few years thereafter, conditions of demand and supply 
favored paper manufacturers.  Prices rose rapidly, price agreements 
among sellers were fairly numerous, and price competition was 
frequently suppressed.”159  
Similarly, a Senate Report from March 1920 concluded that in 
the immediately preceding years “there has existed a shortage of 
newsprint paper,” and that “certain newsprint manufacturers have 
taken advantage of this shortage to exploit the purchasers of such 
paper and hold them up for excessive, unreasonable, and wholly 
unfair prices.”160  The Report added that  
many of the newsprint makers here and in Canada 
were acting in collusion, with the apparent intent to 
bring about restraint of the normal flow of trade and 
engage in unfair competition by methods in some 
cases of creating an artificial supply and in others of 
resorting indirectly through their bureaus of statistics 
to an actual fixing of price.161  
A somewhat different view of the newsprint market during 
the 1919-1920 period appeared in a trade journal of the newsprint 
manufacturers.  The journal published the text of a speech given                 
by W. J. Pape, president of a group called the Publishers Buying 
Corporation.162 According to data provided by Pape, newsprint 
production in the U.S. and Canada increased in 1919 over the 
previous year by 183,000 tons, from 2,000,000 tons to 2,183,000 
tons, and increased yet again in 1920 to 2,395,000 tons, for a nearly 
20% increase over the two-year period, “notwithstanding the drop in 
production and the stoppage of new construction caused by the 
war.”163  Thus, according to Pape, there was no shortage, artificial or 
otherwise, of newsprint.  Instead, Pape argued that prices rose during 
 
158 Guthrie, supra note 148, at 203. 
159 Guthrie, supra note 148, at 211. 
160 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2. 
161 Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2. 
162 W. J. Pape, Publishers Admit Responsibility for Recent High Newsprint Prices, A 
WEEKLY TECHNICAL JOURNAL FOR PAPER AND PULP MILLS, Mar. 23, 1921, at 9. 
163 Id. at 9. 
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this period because of the strong increase in demand by newspaper 
publishers, an increase that the publishers knew was coming.  
According to Pape, in the early months of 1919 “the newspapers 
knew that the greatest boom in advertising ever known was about to 
begin.  It was being prophesied by their association, the advertising 
agencies and the trade press.  A period of record consumption of 
newsprint was at hand.”164  By July 1919, the spot price, which 
earlier in the year had been below the average contract price of $75 
per ton ($3.75 per 100 pounds), rose above that price.  Pape chided 
the publishers who did not adequately prepare for the impending 
increase in demand by securing reserves of newsprint when spot 
market prices were low, but instead “preferr[ed] to run on a hand-to- 
mouth policy.”165 
As for the manufacturers, Pape argued that “it does not seem 
to have occurred to the manufacturers in the early fall of 1919 that 
prices would be abnormally high in 1920.”  Once 1920 rolled around, 
however, the larger manufacturers “raised their contract prices for 
1920 to $80, $90, and $100 a ton,” (corresponding to $4, $4.50,                          
and $5 per 100 pounds) and “[o]ne eastern mill surprised other 
manufacturers and scandalized eastern consumers by charging its 
consumers $130 a ton [$6.50 per 100 pounds] on its 1920 
contracts.”166 Pape’s view was that the publishers, not the 
manufacturers, were to blame for the higher contract prices and 
significantly higher spot prices (between $200 and $440 per ton, 
corresponding to $10 and $22 per 100 pounds) in 1920.167  Naturally, 
the manufacturers’ trade journal was happy to print this speech. The 
Publishers Buying Corporation, of which Pape was president, was 
formed in April 1920 in response to the crisis.  Thus, although Pape 
disagrees with the cause of the rising prices during late 1919 and 
1920, in a way that perhaps not coincidentally supports the formation 
and importance of the newly formed entity he was heading, he 
confirms that the higher prices in the foreseeable future could or 
should have been anticipated at least by the publishers in the summer 
of 1919. 
 
164 Id. at 10. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 11. 
167 Pape, supra note 162, at 11 (According to Pape, “90 percent of the 1920 tonnage was 
sold under contract and . . . the extortionate spot prices applied to only about 5 percent of the 
production.”). 
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B.  The Contract  
Given that background, we may now consider why the parties 
might have written the contract the way they did. Many of the 
contract provisions corresponded with the usual practice in the 
newsprint paper market, and likely with Remington’s prior contracts 
given that (according to Judge Crane’s dissent) the contract was 
based on Remington’s standard form.  First, the contract term was 
structured consistently with a year-long contract based on the 
calendar year.  The contract had fixed prices for the last four months 
of 1919 and then provided for a reset of prices at the beginning of the 
calendar year 1920.  Second, the fact that the parties left prices 
“open” for 1920 was also consistent with standard practice in the 
industry.  Prices in the newsprint market did not stay constant over 
the year and future market prices were hard to predict.  Third, the fact 
that the parties did set prices for the first four months is also 
consistent with standard industry practice.  Many, if not most, 
contracts in the newsprint industry at that time provided for price 
resets every quarter.168  The first month of the contract, September 
1919, was the last month of the third quarter of 1919 and had a fixed 
price, most likely based on the prices for that quarter that existed in 
contracts in the industry,169 which would have been known to the 
parties.  The next three months of the contract (October-December 
1919) had a higher fixed price, which could have been based on a 
reasonable prediction of what market prices were likely to be in the 
last quarter (most of those contract prices would probably have been 
determined around the same time or not long after the contract was 
made).  
 
168 See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2.  The Report states that in the three years 
before 1920, “the contracts nearly all have the same terms of delivery and reserve the right to 
readjust terms quarterly.  Even the large publishers can not to-day, in most cases, contract for 
a year’s supply at a fixed annual price.  The mills, with few exceptions, reserve the right to 
fix prices quarterly and there is invariably a rise in price each quarter.  Moreover, it has been 
the custom of the large manufacturers during the past three years to notify their customers in 
advance that it would be necessary to reduce their previous allotments.” That was apparently 
a change from the years leading up to 1917.  See FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48 
(stating that most newsprint bought by the large dailies at the time was pursuant to one-year 
contracts at fixed prices). 
169 The price stated in the contract for September 1919 was $3.73 3/4 per 100 pounds or 
$74.75 per ton. W. J. Paper, president of the Publishers Buying Corporation, reported an 
average contract price of $75 per ton in July 1919. See Pape, supra note 162, at 10. 
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1. The Sixteen-Month Duration 
The contract did, however, contain several apparently unique 
features, including the open price duration term emphasized by 
Cardozo and at the heart of his view of the case.  But that was not the 
only unusual feature of the contract.  For some reason, Sun Printing 
found itself in need of a new contract before the end of 1919.  
Perhaps Sun Printing’s needs for paper increased beyond what it had 
contracted for at the beginning of 1919, or perhaps Sun Printing had 
contracted with a different manufacturer for 1919 and either Sun 
Printing or its contracting partner had decided not to perform.  In 
response to this situation, Sun Printing and Remington could have 
chosen simply to contract for the remainder of 1919 and then enter 
into a new contract for 1920 in December 1919, but they did not.  
Instead, they stipulated that the relationship would last for sixteen 
months.  Whether this attempted locking in of a contract partner for 
1920 was more important to the buyer or the seller or whether it was 
of equal importance to both parties is not clear.  Even though both 
parties may have wanted to ensure the stability of a longer-term 
relationship, there were plenty of alternative publishers and paper 
manufacturers for the parties to deal with.  We can get some 
information, however, from what we know of the market conditions 
existing at the time as reflected in the other contract provisions. 
2. The Price Ceiling  
The key provision, another apparently unique feature of the 
contract, was the stipulation that the price could be no “higher than 
the contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian Export 
Company to the large consumers.”  This provision was a price 
maximum or ceiling.  The most natural reason the parties would 
agree to a price ceiling and not a floor is that they thought there was a 
reasonable possibility that market prices would increase over the term 
of the contract.  That the parties contemplated higher prices over the 
term of the contract is further reflected in the fact that the stated price 
for the last three months of 1919 was higher than the stated price for 
September 1919.170  Moreover, the expectation of higher prices was 
 
170 Two alternative possibilities are that the September 1919 price was some kind of price 
discount by Remington to induce Sun Printing to agree to the sixteen-month contract, or – 
less likely – that the October-December price was some kind of above-market price designed 
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supported by the prevailing market conditions at the time, as noted in 
the last section.  These market conditions included not only increased 
demand for newsprint, which could lead to a newsprint shortage, but 
also the concern with recent and possibly continuing anti-competitive 
(collusive) behavior by the newspaper manufacturers.  Either of these 
scenarios could have led Sun Printing to want to lock in a contract for 
1920 early. 
Of course, it is possible that market prices could have fallen 
over the term of the contract.171  Some unexpected new technology 
could have been invented that reduced production costs for paper 
manufacturers significantly, for example.  Alternatively, exports from 
other countries could have increased.  But neither these, nor other 
typical causes of falling prices seemed to be on the horizon.172  
Although new plants and adding new machines to existing plants 
could increase capacity and competition, as had happened earlier in 
the decade, the Association (according to the Government, at least) 
and World War I suppressed the building of new plants.  Government 
supervision over prices had only recently ended and even if 
manufacturers decided to build new plants or add new machines, it 
would take some time to do those things and other parties in the 
market would likely know well in advance of future enhanced 
capacity.173  It’s telling, for example, that Remington (as discussed 
 
to induce Remington to agree to the longer-term contract.  I have found no evidence to 
support either of these possibilities. 
171 Frank A. Munsey, publisher of the New York Sun, as well as the New York Herald, 
New York Evening Telegram, and the Baltimore News, testified before the Senate 
Subcommittee that some publishers did not make contracts for the 1920 year.  He said, 
“There are many men who believed that paper would go lower.” Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 148.  He then added that even he underestimated how much the 
price would rise: “I must say that my judgment was very bad in that respect.  I did not expect 
to see paper keep on climbing the way it has.”  Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 
127, at 148.  Indirectly, Munsey’s testimony supports the idea that Munsey at least was 
expecting prices to rise and that concern was motivating him to make the contract with 
Remington. 
172 Howard Palmer, The History of Paper Making in Northern New York – Part VII, 
Paper: A WEEKLY TECHNICAL JOURNAL FOR PAPER AND PULP MILLS, Mar. 30, 1921, at 13 
(stating that between 1916 and 1921 there had been “[n]o radical changes made in the mills” 
other than “replacing some of the machinery and the rebuilding of the paper machines to 
make them faster”). 
173 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 419-20 (testimony of Victor F. 
Lawson, publisher of the Chicago Daily News, that new mills to alleviate the then-existing 
newsprint shortage would take about two years to build and that adding additional machinery 
would take several months); Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 27 
(testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times, that the 
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below) was at the time of the contract proposing to increase its 
capacity by merger, which would not increase the capacity of the 
industry as a whole, rather than by building a new plant.  Nor was 
there any reason to suppose a decline in demand for newsprint.  Yes, 
the war had ended, which could have reduced demand, but any such 
tendency would have probably been evident by the summer of 1919, 
when the contract was made.  Instead, the indications were that, if 
anything, demand for newsprint was likely to increase,174 especially 
since businesses were starting to recover from the war and taking out 
more advertising space in newspapers. 
Finally, it is possible that the Government had succeeded 
through its antitrust enforcement activity in eliminating the risk of 
collusive behavior in the newsprint industry, which would lead to 
more competition and hence lower prices.  That does not seem to 
have been the perception at the time the contract was drafted, 
however.  On August 20, 1919, right around the time the contract was 
likely entered into, the U.S. Senate passed Resolution 164, 
authorizing an investigation into “the news-print paper industry and 
to ascertain whether it is now or has been engaged in discriminatory, 
unjust, or illegal practice, and whether the prices now being charged 
for news-print paper or similar products are excessive, and the causes 
for existing prices.”175  Although it is possible that the parties might 
have thought that swift Senate action would potentially lead to 
declining prices in 1920, it seems equally if not more plausible that, 
given the past spotty antitrust record of the Government, the Senate’s 
huffing and puffing would not have much practical effect on the 
newsprint manufacturers’ behavior. In fact, on March 6, 1920, just a 
few months after Remington abandoned the contract, the House of 
Representatives asked the Secretary of Commerce to provide 
information concerning “any shortage in the supply of . . . print paper 
and the classes of newspapers or periodicals that have been affected 
by such shortage.”176  Of course, it is possible that the shortage of 
supply would not have been apparent to the parties in August 1919, 
 
Canadian Export Paper Company had installed new machines in November 1919 but they 
would not “go in under a year, or until 1922”).  Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 
127, at 27. 
174 A.R.R. Jones, Canadian Export Paper Co’s Huge Operations: PULP & PAPER 
MAGAZINE, May 5, 1921 at 476 (stating, in 1921, that “the last few years have witnessed an 
unprecedented and unparalleled demand for products of the [paper] industry”). 
175 S. RES. 164, 66th Cong., (Aug. 20, 1919). 
176 H.R. RES. 489, 66th Cong., at 257 (Mar. 6, 1920). 
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but given that the industry likely knew what was going on some time 
before Congress, this evidence provides at least some support for the 
notion that the expectation at the time of the contract was rising 
prices, or at most continued high prices, not declining prices. 
The price ceiling had other important and interesting features.  
First, as Cardozo noted, the maximum was not a numerical price but 
based on prices charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company.  
The Canadian Export Paper Company was not a manufacturer, but 
instead a “central sales organization,” based in Montreal, that handled 
the output of several of Canada’s top paper mills.177  Why would the 
parties peg the maximum to the price charged by the Canadian 
Export Paper Company?  One possibility, noted by Judge Crane’s 
dissent, was that the Canadian price was not a “fluctuating price,” but 
was likely to be stable for the full year.  This suggestion is 
implausible, based both on the nature of the contract and the history 
of the paper industry, and Cardozo was correct to challenge it.  If the 
parties wanted a price maximum that would not fluctuate over the 
term of the contract, one would have expected them to state that price 
maximum explicitly in the contract rather than reference the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price.  Moreover, most contracts in 
the newsprint industry, as we have seen, involved prices that were not 
fixed but were periodically reset over the generally year-long term of 
the contracts. There was no reason to believe the Canadian Export 
Paper Company price did not conform to that business norm. 
Another possible reason to peg the maximum price to the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price would be that the Canadian 
company’s prices tended to be fair representations of the going 
“market” price.  Apparently, the Canadian Export Paper Company 
had “a highly efficient and well equipped statistical department,” in 
which “the official trade returns of practically every country in the 
world are received and collated.”178  If the parties said in their 
 
177 Jones, supra note 174, at 476. 
178 Jones, supra note 174, at 477.  The article continues: 
Constant touch, by means of correspondence, is maintained with the 
government statistical offices of the various countries, and detailed 
information of the pulp and paper trade throughout the world, – and 
much of it of an invaluable kind – is thus obtained. The mode of 
operation followed in this department is for the records to be collected, 
converted into Canadian weights and currency, and issued, in the form of 
monthly, quarterly, and annual reports, to the various departments 
concerned. In this manner close track is kept of the world’s markets, 
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contract that they would agree to a price that reflected the prevailing 
market price, that could have led to distracting and costly 
disagreements over what exactly this price was.  At least the 
Canadian price would be, as the dissent put it, “definite,” as well as, 
apparently, fairly accurate and up to date.179  
The more plausible explanation for pegging the maximum to 
the Canadian Export Paper Company price, however, is that the 
parties anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper Company price 
would not exactly track the “market” price, but would potentially be 
lower, at least for U.S.-based manufacturers.  Otherwise, why agree 
to a price maximum?  In fact, prices by Canadian manufacturers were 
apparently often lower than prices of U.S. manufacturers because of 
the Canadian companies’ greater access to cheaper wood and water 
power.180  In addition, Sun Printing argued in its brief that it would 
 
sources of supply and trade possibilities. 
Jones, supra note 174, at 477. Although this description of statistical record-keeping in a 
leading trade journal is unsurprisingly positive, another perspective was that this information 
facilitated anticompetitive collusion.  See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 2-3 (stating 
that “the companies gathered general statistics on the amount of paper consumed by their 
different customers so as to estimate what quantity of paper would produce the most 
favorable market conditions.”). 
179 Further evidence of the Canadian Export Paper Company’s importance in the market 
can be found in the fact that in February 1919 (several months before the contract), the 
accounting firm Perley Morse published a tract entitled Cost Keeping for Newsprint Paper 
Mills, which proposed a uniform cost accounting system for integrated newsprint 
manufacturers.  See Perley Morse & Co., Cost Keeping for Newsprint Paper Mills (1919). 
The tract was commissioned by an entity called the Committee on Uniform Cost Keeping, of 
which Canadian mills associated with the Canadian Export Pricing Company were members 
and of which one E.S. Coleman, representing those mills, was the co-chair.  The proposed 
system was submitted to the Federal Trade Commission, which in a letter stated that it 
generally approved of the approach, but cautioned that it had not had sufficient time “to 
make a thorough study of this matter such as constructive criticism would require.” Id. at 5. 
180 One contemporary trade article listed the advantages held by the companies 
represented by the Canadian Export Paper Company: 
Prominent among these [advantageous resources] are great water powers 
which guarantee a continuity of service at a reasonable rate, stable in 
flow, with large drainage areas, and with high heads capable of cheap 
development.  Labor is abundant and satisfactory in quality. The 
tidewater locations are easy of access to the great markets of the world.  
The big consuming markets are accessible.  And, finally, there is the 
supreme advantage of efficient and expert management. 
Jones, supra note 174, at 477.  Even if one takes some of these boasts with a grain of salt, 
there is probably at least some truth to them.  See also FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 
114 (stating that the cost of producing newsprint in Canada “is from $4 to $5 [per ton, 
corresponding to $.20 per 100 pounds] less than in this country”); Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 403 (testimony of Mr. Gefeall of the Chicago Daily News that 
the Canadian Export Paper Company did not sell at the highest price it could get “because 
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have in fact contracted with the Canadian Export Paper Company if 
Remington had not been willing to match its (lower) price.  That 
suggests the price maximum was a variation on a “most favored 
nation” clause.  Moreover, the fact that the contract stipulated that the 
price maximum was based not just on any old Canadian Export Paper 
Company price but the price charged to the “large consumers,” who 
were the publishers like Sun Printing most likely to get price 
discounts because of the large volume they purchased, further 
supports the proposition that the Canadian Export Paper Company 
price was, if anything, likely to be lower than the “market” price.181 
But if the parties anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price would be lower than the market price, then why state 
the price as a maximum rather than simply say that the price will be 
the Canadian Export Paper Company price?  One possibility might be 
that Remington might have been reluctant to agree to expressly tie 
the contract price to that of the Canadian Export Paper Company for 
fear of arousing the antitrust regulators.182  More likely, the buyer 
was protecting against the (possibly remote) possibility that the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price could rise above the market 
price and the seller was willing to give the buyer protection against 
that contingency. 
Thus, the price maximum was most likely designed as a form 
of partial price protection for Sun Publishing, which feared higher 
market prices over the duration of the contract and sought to reduce 
this risk to some degree.  Remington might have been willing to give 
Sun Publishing this protection for several reasons.  First, Remington 
might have been anxious to obtain and lock in Sun Printing’s 
significant business for 1920, and offering some price protection was 
a way to do so.  Remington might have been particularly interested in 
shoring up customers for 1920 early because it had been in 
negotiations to merge with the St. Regis Paper Company, the number 
twelve U.S. producer in 1916.  Negotiations concerning this merger, 
 
the price of domestic paper, American mills, was higher than that”). 
181 The Canadian Export Paper Company sold not only to the large dailies but also to 
jobbers who resold to smaller newspapers.  FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 42. 
182 This concern would not have been entirely speculative. Several months after 
Remington abandoned the contract in December 1919, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed a resolution asking the Secretary of Commerce to furnish information concerning, 
among other things, “whether any class of newspapers have secured by contract or otherwise 
any undue preference or advantage over other classes of newspapers in the supply of print 
paper; and such information.” H.R. RES. 489, supra note 176, at 276. 
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which would make Remington the third largest newsprint 
manufacturer in the U.S., were publicized on August 28, 1919,183 and 
were probably known by Sun Printing at the time the contract was 
entered into.  Demonstrating a guaranteed stable of important 
customers might have made the deal more attractive and likely to be 
agreed to by St. Regis.  On the other side, the proposed merger deal 
might have made Sun Printing more apprehensive that Remington 
would be more likely to demand exorbitant prices post-merger 
because of its enhanced market power.  
Second, Remington might have thought it was not making 
much of a concession to Sun Printing because Remington might have 
predicted that the Canadian Export Paper Company price was not 
likely to deviate too much from the prevailing market price.184  The 
anticompetitive version of this story would be that Remington 
anticipated a market more tightly controlled by manufacturers in the 
upcoming year and that the Canadian Export Paper Company, given 
its size and market position in Canada, would be a price leader and 
thus not likely to undercut prevailing market prices.185  An alternative 
reason Remington might not have been too concerned about the price 
maximum was that Sun Printing agreed to pay Remington any 
difference in freight rates between the rates Sun Printing would have 
to pay to ship the paper from Remington’s mill and the rates it would 
have to pay to ship the paper from the Canadian Export Paper 
Company mills.  So perhaps Remington gave with one hand and took 
back with the other.186  The freight rate differential might not have 
been so great, however.  In 1916, freight rates from mills in eastern 
 
183 Watertown Paper Mills Plan Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1919, at 18. 
184 The subsequent Senate Report provides some support for the theory that the price 
maximum did not result from Sun Printing’s bargaining power or superior market position.  
See Senate 1920 Report, supra note 137, at 5 (“Even the large newsprint publishers are at the 
mercy of the manufacturers. It is a special favor to-day for any manufacturer to contract at 
any price to furnish newsprint paper to any publisher.”). 
185 Victor Lawson and J.A. Gefaell, Declare Canadians Rule Paper Market, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 1920, at 26.  That article reported that the sales manager of the Interstate Pulp and 
Paper Company testified before Congress that “[a] combination of Canadian manufacturers 
practically controls the print paper market through the Canadian Export Paper Company” 
and that “the prices it set were followed by other manufacturers.”  In addition, the publisher 
of the Chicago Daily News testified that “his experience had been that the Canadian 
company prevented competition.” 
186 See FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 48 (“The chief cause of the variation in prices 
between different sections of the country is the wide range in freight rates due to the 
localization of the news-print industry in the spruce timber regions of northern United States 
and in Canada.”). 
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states to New York City averaged $.14 per 100 pounds ($2.80 per 
ton),187 whereas freight rates from Canadian provinces to various 
states in the U.S. ranged from $.10 to $.20 per 100 pounds ($2 to $4 
per ton).188  The New York Times reported paying $.23 per 100 
pounds ($4.60 per ton) for freight on its contracts with the Canadian 
Export Paper Company in 1920.189  And Remington’s main mills 
were located in Norfolk and Raymondtown, New York (northeast of 
its headquarters in Watertown), near the Canadian border and only 
about 100 miles from Montreal, the headquarters of the Canadian 
Export Paper Company.  The freight rate provision may have just 
been a hedge against any attempt by the Canadian Export Paper 
Company to charge its customers lower base prices but then get the 
money back by charging them more for shipping. 
3. The Price Duration Term  
That leaves the price duration term.  Why might the parties 
have left that open?  The first thing to note is that to the extent that 
the parties expected prices to rise in 1920, the buyer would generally 
favor a longer price term and the seller would generally favor a 
shorter price term – that is, a price term with more frequent price 
adjustments – to align more closely with rising market prices. The 
standard price duration term in the industry was three months 
(quarterly) and that was reflected in the price term for the first four 
months of the contract, as discussed above.  Why not just agree to a 
quarterly price duration term?  Perhaps this was another concession 
that Remington extracted from Sun Printing in exchange for the price 
maximum.  Remington perhaps wanted to reserve the possibility of 
more frequent (e.g. monthly or bi-monthly) price adjustments.  
But it’s not clear that Remington would actually benefit from 
this possibility.  It would depend on the duration of the Canadian 
Export Paper Company contracts with its large customers.  If the 
Canadian Export Paper Company followed the three-month price 
 
187 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 49. For the 1917 contracts, freight rates in the 
northeast averaged around $.15.  FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 57. 
188 FTC 1917 Report, supra note 125, at 50.  It’s not clear whether the parties meant that 
the applicable freight rate for the Canadian Export Paper Company would be the freight rates 
it charged its largest customers, or the freight rates it would charge for shipping paper to 
New York City, where Sun was located. 
189 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 22-23 (testimony of George 
McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times). 
48
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/10
2018 THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUN PRINTING 131 
term that was the industry norm at the time, then that price would be 
fixed for three months.  Suppose in January 1920 that the Canadian 
Export Paper Company agreed to three-month price terms with its 
large customers and set the contract price at $4.50 per 100 pounds.  
That price would prevail for January, February, and March.  Even if 
spot market or contract prices rose during that period, if Remington 
demanded a monthly reset of prices, the contract price under the 
maximum price term would still be $4.50 each month until the next 
reset of the Canadian Export Paper Company contract prices in April 
1920.  So, insisting on a monthly price would not do Remington any 
good.  That suggests the open price duration term, like the price 
maximum term, was actually for the benefit of Sun Printing, the 
buyer.  If the parties were to deviate from the three-month price 
duration norm, it would likely be to lengthen the price duration term, 
something Remington would probably not agree to unless both 
parties thought prices were likely to remain stable for longer than 
three months.  
Alternatively, it is possible that the parties did not know what 
price duration term the Canadian Export Paper Company would use 
in 1920 and were just waiting to see what it did.  The dissent suggests 
this possibility by saying the price duration from the Canadian Export 
Paper Company contract could be used to fill the price duration gap.  
The natural question, however, is why the parties did not simply say 
that. They could have said that the price would be no greater, and 
price duration no shorter, than those in the Canadian Export Paper 
Company contracts.  But it is possible the parties thought they had 
effectively said that, and Sun Printing did not realize that the failure 
to spell out the duration more explicitly would be fatal to 
enforcement of the contract.  As Cardozo himself perceptively noted, 
there was a close connection between price and price duration.  But 
Cardozo did not follow the implication of this insight to its 
reasonable conclusion.  To say that the price was to be no higher than 
the Canadian Export Paper Company’s “contract price” was arguably 
a shorthand.  It was not necessary to reference the price duration 
because, of course, the price duration could not be any shorter than 
that reflected in the Canadian company’s contracts once the parties 
settled on the Canadian price maximum.  
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C. Why did Remington Breach the Contract in 1920?  
As Cardozo notes in his opinion, and as discussed above, 
market prices indeed rose during 1920. Although that would 
generally motivate a seller to avoid its contract, that would be true 
only if the contract price were fixed.  But the contract price was to be 
renegotiated in December 1919.  So, the key must be the Canadian 
Export Paper Company contract price, which was the crucial feature 
of the Sun Printing-Remington contract.190  What was that price?  It 
turns out that the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price was 
$4.50 per 100 pounds,191 a 12.5% increase over the Sun Printing-
Remington contract price for the last quarter, and probably not too far 
out of whack from the going contract prices.192  What is interesting, 
however, is what happened to the price duration term.  For its 
contracts beginning in January 1920, the Canadian Export Paper 
Company, somewhat surprisingly increased its contract price duration 
term from three months (quarterly) in 1919, to six months.193  
 
190 The publisher of the New York Sun, Frank A. Munsey, testified before Congress in 
May 1920 that all the other manufacturers other than Remington had kept their contracts 
with him. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 130. That suggests that what 
led to the breach was the unique aspects of the contract with Remington. 
191 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 21 (testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the 
New York Times, that it had a contract with the Canadian Export Paper Company at 4 ½ 
cents per pound, or $4.50 per 100 pounds); Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, 
at 118 (testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business Manager of the Washington, D.C. Evening 
Star, that he made a contract with the Canadian Export Paper Company in December 1919 at 
4 ½ cents per pound, or $4.50 per 100 pounds). 
192 The publisher of the New York Sun, Frank A. Munsey, testified that he was able to get 
a 4 ½ contract price for the first quarter of 1920, suggesting that the Canadian Export Paper 
Company contract price tracked the market price at that time, although it could be that he 
was simply referencing the contract with Remington that he thought he had.  Senate 
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 141.  The subsequent Senate Report found that 
contract prices for the large metropolitan daily publishers during the first quarter ranged 
from 3 cents to 5 cents per pound ($3 to $5 per 100 pounds).  See Senate 1920 Report, supra 
note 137, at 4.  But see Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 21 (testimony of 
George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New York Times, that at the beginning of 1920 
it had contracts with one mill for 6.75 cents per pound and one contract with a price 
changing monthly that ran from 7 ½ cents to 8 ¼ cents per pound). 
193 Compare Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 434 with Senate 
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee Hearings, 
supra note 127, at 21-22 (testimony of George McAneny, Executive Manager of the New 
York Times, discussing contracts with the Canadian Export Paper Company, which in 1919 
had quarterly adjustments, and in 1920, which had an adjustment after six months); Senate 
Subcommittee  Hearings, supra note 127, at 116 (testimony of Fleming Newbold, Business 
Manager of the Washington, D.C. Evening Star, that it had a contract at 4 ½ cents with the 
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Perhaps to compensate for the apparent generosity to the 
buyer of that price duration term, given the expected increase in 
prices during 1920, the Canadian contract also changed one other 
feature of its contract.  The 1919 contract had stated that the price for 
the first three months was $3.65 per 100 pounds. It then had 
provided: “[t]he price for the second three months, and for each 
succeeding three-month period, shall be such as the parties shall 
mutually agree, and in case of failure to so agree, this contract shall 
terminate at the end of any three-month period for which price has 
been so agreed upon.”194  In the 1920 contract, however, the “price 
for the second six months [is] to be fixed exclusively by the seller on 
or before June 1, 1920.”195  That is, the contract changed from one 
requiring mutual agreement at the time of the price reset, to one 
giving the seller unilateral discretion to reset the price. 
Thus, although this information does not provide a conclusive 
reason as to why Remington breached, it does suggest why 
Remington would have been unhappy. The Canadian Export Paper 
Co. extended its contract duration term during a time of rapidly rising 
market prices. Although I have not been able to determine exactly 
how much Remington gained from avoiding the contract or how 
much Sun Printing lost, at the very least, Remington was probably 
not expecting the Canadian Company’s change in business 
practices.196  
 
Canadian Export Paper Company until July 1, 1920 and after that time the price was “subject 
to change by the manufacturer”). 
194 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 435. 
195 Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 432.  A letter from G.F. Steele, 
General Manager of the Canadian Export Paper Company, to Victor F. Lawson, Publisher of 
the Chicago Daily News, dated April 26, 1920, stated that Steele expected that on July 1, 
1920, he expected to impose “quite a material advance in price.” Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 432; see also Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 
21 (New York Times contract with Canadian Export Paper Company also had a price for the 
first six months, after which the company had “the right to change their figures to all their 
customers on the 1st of July”).  Because the Senate Hearings in which this letter was 
presented occurred in May 1920, they do not reveal how big the price increase was. 
196 The testimony of Frank A. Munsey, the publisher of the Sun, at Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings on the Newsprint Paper Industry on May 1, 1920 provides some insight, but 
because the focus of the inquiry was elsewhere, the testimony is ambiguous and 
inconclusive. First, Munsey stated that he was currently paying 5 cents per pound 
(corresponding to $5 per 100 pounds or $100 per ton) for contract newsprint in the second 
quarter of 1920 after paying 4 ½ cents in the first quarter (corresponding to $4.50 per 100 
pounds, the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price). Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings, supra note 127, at 141. If that was the case, then given the Canadian Export Paper 
Company’s price of 4 ½ cents per pound (corresponding to $4.50 per 100 pounds and $90 
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IV.  CARDOZO’S ANALYSIS REVISITED  
Now that we have some sense of what was going on at the 
time Sun Printing and Remington made their contract, we can return 
to Cardozo’s opinion to reconsider his analysis in light of these facts. 
A. The Canadian Export Paper Company Contract and     
the Materiality of the Open Price Duration Term 
For a contract to be indefinite, the missing term or terms must 
be material.  Cardozo’s first argument is that the open price duration 
term was material, even if the buyer agreed to pay the maximum 
Canadian Export Paper Company price.  Cardozo, following the 
suggestion of Remington’s counsel, leads us to believe the price 
duration term was material in part by implying that the Canadian 
Export Paper Company price was a constantly fluctuating price, or at 
least that the duration of the Canadian Export Paper Company price 
 
per ton), the damages on the Remington contract for the first three months of 1920 would 
have been 0, and in the second quarter of 1920, during which 3000 tons were to have been 
delivered, would have been only $30,000. If those prices had prevailed during the third and 
fourth quarters, that would result in only $90,000 in damages, far less than the $910,000 of 
“general” damages alleged by Sun Printing.  It is, of course, possible that the market prices 
continued to rise during the third and fourth quarters of 1920 to such an extent (Sun Printing 
alleged that the prices rose to as much as $11.75 per 100 pounds) that the $910,000 figure 
alleged by Sun Printing would make sense, but that would only be the case if the Canadian 
Export Paper Company kept its contract price at $4.50 per 100 pounds for the second half of 
1920, which seems very unlikely.  If the Canadian price stayed at $4.50 per 100 pounds, and 
the market price was $11.75, then Sun Printing’s damages for the last six months of 1920 
would be $870,000 [($11.75-$4.50) x 20 x 6000]. 
  The 1920 contract price of $5 per 100 pounds stated by Munsey is also significantly 
less than other large papers were reporting paying on their contracts during 1920.  See 
Declare Canadians Rule Paper Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1920.  I am not sure how to 
reconcile the discrepancy. Perhaps Munsey was not able to get contracts for all of the 
newsprint he was supposed to get from Remington, or was not able to get them for the first 
quarter of 1920. He does mention having to go into the spot market, where he had to pay as 
much as 12 cents per pound ($12 per 100 pounds), but then said that he was no longer 
buying in the spot market as of May 1, 1920. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 
127, at 141.  Later in his testimony, he said that between contract and spot purchases, his 
average price for newsprint was 6 cents per pound. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra 
note 127, at 146.  Finally, Munsey added that “with the situation that developed and the 
welshing on the part of the Remington Paper Co., and the way that things have turned out, if 
I had not bought the New York Herald with its paper contract I should have been compelled 
to stop either the morning or the evening Sun. I could not have got the paper.” Senate 
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 146. I do not know whether Munsey actually 
bought the Herald as an act of mitigation or whether he had already purchased it and just 
lucked out in inheriting its contracts, which presumably left the Herald with more newsprint 
than it needed. 
52
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/10
2018 THE UNCERTAINTY OF SUN PRINTING 135 
would be shorter than the price duration term that Sun Printing and 
Remington were likely to agree on.  Hence, Cardozo states that the 
parties “did not understand that, if during the term so established the 
price charged by the Canadian Export Paper Company was changed, 
the price payable to the seller would fluctuate accordingly.”197  
But Cardozo’s suggestion ignores the fact that the parties in 
their contract referenced the Canadian Export Paper Company 
contract price, not a spot market price.  If the Canadian Export Paper 
Company sold to the “large customers” under contracts rather than on 
the spot market, which it did,198 the price it charged would last for the 
duration of the price term of those contracts, and would change only 
when the contract price with the large customers was reset.  Thus, as 
noted in the previous section, so long as Sun Printing was willing to 
pay the Canadian Export Paper Company price, the price duration 
term of the Sun Printing-Remington contract would be immaterial at 
the time of the initial price reset unless one or both parties sought a 
price duration term longer than the contract price duration term of the 
Canadian Export Paper Company contracts. Again, as noted in the 
last section, the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price for 
January 1920 was $4.50 per 100 pounds of newsprint and that price 
term lasted for six months. Because Sun Printing agreed to pay this 
price, there would have been no point in the parties negotiating a 
price duration term less than six months, unless Sun Printing for 
some reason expected not to want to continue paying the Canadian 
maximum price for the whole six months, which was not likely in a 
rising market.  And although Remington would obviously have 
objected to a price duration term longer than six months, there is no 
evidence that Sun Printing sought that. 
If this point is correct, then not only did the Canadian Export 
Paper Company contract price act as a price maximum, but the 
Canadian Export Paper Company contract duration simultaneously 
acted as a price duration minimum.  Cardozo missed this point.  
Instead, he found no language in the contract to support the argument 
that “there was no need of an agreement as to time unless the price to 
 
197 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
198 See testimony of Mr. McAneny, Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 127, at 38 
(“You take the big ones, the International, the Great Northern, the Canadian Export, those 
three groups comprise the great majority of tonnage.  I do not think any of them sell except 
at their contract price.  They fix one price for every customer and they do not depart from 
that.”). 
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be paid was lower than the maximum.”199  Contrary to Cardozo’s 
reasoning, the language and structure of the contract do support the 
argument.  If, as Cardozo surmised, Sun Printing’s exercising the 
“option” to expressly agree to pay the maximum price would solve 
the indefiniteness problem caused by the open price term, then 
exercising the same option to impliedly agree to the minimum 
duration in the Canadian contract, which stated that maximum price, 
should have solved any indefiniteness problem with the open price 
duration term.200 
B. The Option Theory, Market Prices, and the Buyer’s 
Ability to Take Advantage of the Seller 
The heart of Cardozo’s argument is that filling the price 
duration term with one-month periods would give the buyer a dozen 
options, to which the seller would not plausibly have agreed because 
the seller would “never knew where it stood” and would be placed “at 
the mercy of the buyer.”201  Cardozo uses two hypothetical examples 
to prove his points: a rising Canadian Export Paper Company price, 
and a declining market price.  To unpack and critique Cardozo’s 
reasoning, let us take as given for the moment Cardozo’s assumption 
(wrong though it was) that the filled-in price duration would be one 
month.  First, what does Cardozo mean by the buyer having an 
“option?”  At the very least, he means that the buyer did not have to 
accept the Canadian maximum price.  But Cardozo also implies that 
having an option meant that the buyer could, if it chose, simply 
abandon the contract without consequence if it did not want to pay 
the Canadian maximum price.  That seems to be the sense in which 
Cardozo believes the seller would be disadvantaged by the option 
interpretation.  Cardozo’s argument raises several further questions: 
When would the buyer not want to accept the maximum price?  How 
likely were these conditions to arise?  If these conditions did arise, 
did the parties really expect or intend that the buyer could simply 
walk away from the contract?  And even if the buyer did walk away 
or threaten to do so, would that place the seller at the buyer’s mercy? 
The primary reason the buyer would fail to choose the 
 
199 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
200 It is perhaps worth pointing out that the price duration term also had a maximum–one 
year–the amount of time left on the contract.  Id. at 470. 
201 Id. at 471. 
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Canadian Export Paper Company contract price would be if the 
“market” price fell below the Canadian company’s contract price. 
The key, therefore, was the relationship between the Canadian price 
and the market price, not whether those prices were rising or falling.  
Yet Cardozo writes as if an increase in the Canadian Export Paper 
Company price alone might lead Sun Printing to decline to exercise 
its “option” to continue paying it.  It is, of course, true that buyers 
prefer to pay lower prices than higher prices. But even if the 
Canadian Export Paper Company price rose, so long as market prices 
also rose and the Canadian Export Paper Company price remained 
below the market price, which is what happened, Sun Printing would 
still have an incentive to choose the Canadian Export Paper Company 
price throughout the term of the contract.  Sun Printing would not do 
better by abandoning the contract and either entering into a substitute 
contract or going into the spot market to buy newsprint.202  Similarly, 
under Cardozo’s second hypothetical example, falling market prices 
would not lead Sun Printing to abandon the contract so long as the 
Canadian price also fell and remained at or below market prices. 
Next, the analysis in the last section suggests that the parties 
anticipated that the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price 
was likely to remain lower, or at least not rise above, the prevailing 
market price offered to the large newsprint publishers.  In fact, that 
was the whole point of using the Canadian Export Paper Company 
price as a maximum.  Thus, there was no reason to anticipate that the 
buyer would want to exit the contract, and that is in fact what 
happened.  The Canadian Export Paper Company contract price 
remained below the market price and the buyer expressed its 
willingness to pay the Canadian company’s price for the remaining 
twelve months of the contract.  Of course, it is possible that the 
Canadian price could have risen above the market price.  For 
example, the United States could have suddenly and unexpectedly 
increased tariffs on Canadian newsprint.  Alternatively, perhaps Sun 
Printing would have been able to find some newsprint manufacturer 
with sufficient capacity and a willingness to undercut the Canadian 
 
202 Even if the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price rose above the market 
price for long-term contracts, it is unlikely that it would have risen above the spot market 
price, which was generally higher at the time than contract prices. See FTC 1917 Report, 
supra note 125, at 49. (“Contract purchases ordinarily average a lower price than market 
purchases, and transactions involving large quantities a lower price than those involving 
small quantities.”). 
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Export Paper Company contract price.  But the likelihood of those 
scenarios was probably pretty small at the time Sun Printing and 
Remington negotiated the contract. 
Suppose, however, that for some reason the Canadian Export 
Paper Company contract price had risen above the market price.  
Suppose, for example, that the Canadian company raised its contract 
price in July 1920 (the second six-month period) to an above-market 
price to make up for its low price for the first six months (recall that 
contract with its buyers allowed it to unilaterally set the price after six 
months).  Would Sun Printing have just walked away from the 
contract in that case at the time of price renegotiation?  Most likely 
not.  Sun Printing would probably have sought to renegotiate the 
price to the lower market price, as permitted by the contract. 
Remington would likely have accepted that price, or something close 
to it, since Remington would not have done much better selling to a 
different buyer if Sun Printing walked away from the contract 
negotiations.  If there were costs involved in the buyer switching 
suppliers mid-year, or foregone benefits in losing a long-term 
relationship with the seller, perhaps the price would be negotiated 
somewhere between the market price and the Canadian price.  
It is true that the parties might not reach a deal through either 
stubborn bargaining positions or honest disagreement about what 
counted as the market price.  Probably, however, they would have 
agreed, and that is what the parties would have expected to happen at 
the time they made the contract.  From that conclusion to the 
conclusion that the parties “intended” this result is not a big leap; in 
fact, it is the leap that UCC § 2-305 takes in allowing courts to fill in 
open price terms with a “reasonable” (i.e. market) price.  In any case, 
the likelihood of the buyer walking away from the contract seems 
very small.  Thus, viewing the contract as an “option” in the 
traditional sense seems misleading. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, in what possible sense could 
enforcing the contract have placed Remington at Sun Printing’s 
mercy?  As discussed above, Remington was likely unhappy with the 
contract because the market price rose while the Canadian Export 
Paper Company contract price was fixed for six months, but that 
problem cannot be what Cardozo had in mind.  Remington’s 
unhappiness was a consequence of the express price maximum to 
which Remington had agreed, and the resulting risk associated with 
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agreeing to that maximum.203  The same would have been true if both 
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price and the market 
price had fallen, but the relationship between the two remained the 
same (Canadian contract price below market price).  Perhaps if both 
prices dropped, but the Canadian Export Paper Company price fell 
below Remington’s costs of production, Remington would have a 
legitimate ground for complaint, but that possibility seems remote 
and could perhaps have been dealt with by allowing excuse for the 
seller.  If, on the other hand, the Canadian Export Paper Company 
price had risen above the market price and Sun Printing for whatever 
reason had abandoned the contract, Remington would have been no 
worse off than if the contract had not been made.  It would likely 
have been able to find another buyer willing to pay the then-
prevailing market price.  Thus, although Remington was certainly 
disadvantaged by the way things turned out, it is hard to see how it 
was, or could have been, placed at Sun Printing’s mercy. If 
Remington was at the mercy of anything, it was the contract to which 
Remington voluntarily agreed. 
C.  Filling in the Price Duration Term 
Cardozo’s third main argument is that there was no 
reasonable way for the court to fill in the missing price duration term.  
Specifically, Cardozo objected to reading into the contract a monthly 
price duration term.  In Cardozo’s view, since the contract language 
spoke of an agreement about price duration rather than a monthly 
term, implying a term based on trade usage would “make the contract 
over.”204  Moreover, Cardozo emphasized that the buyer had not 
allowed the seller to choose a price duration, but instead had insisted 
on a monthly duration, possibly for self-serving reasons.  None of 
these points is convincing. 
 
203 Remington could perhaps have argued that because the Canadian Export Paper 
Company acted in an unexpected way in extending its contract term to six months, 
Remington should have been excused from the contract on the ground of mutual mistake.  It 
is unlikely that claim would have succeeded at the time, or even today.  The claim resembles 
the one that prevailed (many years after Sun Printing) in the famous Alcoa case (involving a 
price index designed by Alan Greenspan that did not perform as the parties anticipated), 
though that case has been subject to extensive criticism (though I happen to agree with the 
Alcoa court’s result) and has not generally been followed. see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. 
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 55 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
204 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
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Cardozo’s focus on monthly pricing (the “dozen options” 
theory) as the most likely gap-filler is understandable.  The duration 
of the initial price in the contract was one month.  The contract had 
monthly delivery and payment terms, which (along with the fifteen-
day advance notice requirement) makes it unlikely the parties 
contemplated a price duration less than one month. The dissent 
mentioned one month as one of its possible gap-filling durations,205 
and Sun Printing made monthly demands to Remington for delivery 
after Remington declared it would no longer perform. 
Nevertheless, a quarterly price term duration would have been 
the more plausible gap-filler.  As noted above, the contract language 
provided two important reference points on price duration.  It 
structured the price for the first four months consistently with 
quarterly pricing.  The fact that the initial price was only one month 
was likely a consequence of the fact that it was the last month of the 
third quarter of 1919.  Moreover, as Judge Crane pointed out in his 
dissent, the contract specifically referenced the contract price of the 
Canadian Export Paper Company, which (unbeknownst to Judge 
Crane) had most recently used quarterly pricing in its contracts.206 
Moreover, quarterly pricing was the standard price duration term for 
year-long contracts in the newsprint industry.207  The fact that on 
remand Sun Printing argued for quarterly pricing also supports this 
conclusion.  Whether to imply a quarterly price duration gap-filler 
would have been an issue if the Canadian Export Paper Company had 
reduced its contract price duration to, say, one month in 1920 and 
Sun Printing insisted on quarterly pricing.  As it turned out, however, 
the Canadian Export Paper Company contract price duration was six 
months (as already noted), so implying a quarterly price duration 
term for the first quarter of 1920 would not have made sense. It is 
puzzling that Sun Printing did not point this out and argue for six-
month pricing periods. 
Finally, the fact that Sun Printing made monthly demands 
after Remington declined to perform is most likely a result of the fact 
that the deliveries were to be made monthly, not an assertion of the 
 
205 Id. at 472. 
206 Id. 
207 Quarterly pricing was also the standard used in the St. Regis case, which Cardozo had 
decided only months before Sun Printing.  St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper 
Co., 138 N.E. 495, 496-97 (N.Y. 1923).  Somehow, that fact did not stick in the minds of 
either Cardozo or Crane. 
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price duration term Sun Printing preferred. To the extent that 
Cardozo was suggesting that Sun Printing was acting 
opportunistically in asserting one-month duration periods, that 
suggestion makes no sense. As Cardozo mentions in his opinion and 
as the background discussed above shows, prices in the newsprint 
market were rising and were expected to continue rising.  Under 
those circumstances, the buyer would want the longest price duration 
possible and the seller would prefer a shorter price duration.  If 
anything, the one-month price duration period would have been most 
favorable to Remington, putting aside the Canadian contract duration.  
Moreover, even on remand when Sun Printing could have argued for 
a six-month duration term based on the Canadian Export Paper 
Company contracts, it argued only for a quarterly price duration term 
(though that may have been a meaningless show of generosity given 
that a quarterly price duration term would not, for reasons already 
explained, have changed the outcome).  In any case, Cardozo’s 
insinuation of bad behavior by Sun Printing turns out to be more than 
a bit ironic.  Even under the “cure by concession” view mentioned by 
Cardozo and supported by several commentators, Sun Printing 
acceded to the price duration term most generous to Remington.  
Thus, Cardozo should have enforced the contract. 
D. Stability and Certainty 
Underlying Cardozo’s analysis in Sun Printing is a larger 
jurisprudential point. In Cardozo’s view, declining to enforce the 
contract would promote “stability and certainty.”208  But how, 
exactly?  There are two possibilities: more certain law, and more 
certain contracts. 
Uncertainty in contract law can certainly create uncertainty 
for businesses subject to that law. They may respond to that 
uncertainty by writing more detailed contract terms to overcome it, 
by attempting to exploit it to their advantage and the disadvantage of 
their contracting partners, or at the extreme by foregoing contracts.  
In my view, however, Cardozo’s opinion does not reduce uncertainty 
in contract law. Cardozo does repeat the contract law “rule” that 
agreements to agree are not enforceable (albeit not until about 
halfway through his analysis), but how does his opinion clarify 
 
208 Sun Printing, 139 N.E. at 471. 
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contracting parties’ understanding of that rule?  Cardozo himself 
suggests that he might have been willing to enforce the contract, 
despite its “agreement to agree” language, if the parties had left              
open only the price term, so Cardozo apparently believes that                 
some agreements to agree are enforceable. Which ones? Perhaps 
Cardozo’s gloss on the “rule” is that one open material term is not 
fatal but two or more are. Or that if the parties leave out the price 
term and one other material term, the contract is indefinite. Or 
perhaps the rule is limited to price and a term closely connected to 
price. Or perhaps the rule is limited to situations in which enforcing 
the contract would enable one party to place the other at its mercy.  It 
is hard to know. 
Cardozo advises that courts may not “revise” contracts, but 
may “construe” them.209  How does one tell the difference?  Cardozo 
suggests a textualist approach that refuses to make the parties 
“conform to the practice and beliefs of others”210 in the face of a 
contract that does just that in the form of the price maximum set 
according to the contract price of the Canadian Export Paper 
Company.  Moreover, Cardozo seems to have been willing to 
consider contextual evidence if Sun Printing had provided it, 
especially if the evidence would reduce Cardozo’s concern that 
enforcing the contract would permit the buyer to take unfair 
advantage of the seller.  Thus, Cardozo does not provide much clarity 
or certainty on this question either. 
Cardozo’s bigger concern is that the parties themselves need 
to write more certain contracts, so that courts can “construe” rather 
than “revise” them.  He suggests that the parties “with little change of 
language” could (and therefore should) have written a more certain 
contract.  The issue, however, is not whether the parties could have 
written a more complete contract but why they did not and whether it 
would have been efficient to do so.  If the parties thought it not worth 
the time and trouble to spell out a precise price duration term, or if 
they thought they actually did spell it out in by referencing the 
Canadian Export Paper Company’s contract price, then why should 
the court not respect that decision?  Renegotiated price terms were 
the norm in newsprint contracts at the time. Cardozo’s opinion 
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enforceability of all those contracts, which no one before had any 
reason to doubt, an open question.  Moreover, Cardozo’s question 
could be turned around.  “With little change of language,” the parties 
could have stated that if they did not reach agreement on the price or 
price duration terms, the contract would terminate.211  That is 
precisely what the Canadian Export Paper Company did in its 1919 
contracts and also what the St. Regis company did in the contract that 
Cardozo and his colleagues had addressed only months before the 
Sun Printing case.212 
Cardozo’s view may be that it does not matter whether the 
parties “intended” to have the court enforce the contract if they could 
not reach agreement, because the “indefiniteness” rule is really about 
regulating contracting behavior regardless of their intentions.213                   
But Cardozo’s opinion on this point, as on the others, is highly 
ambiguous. Even if one accepts that Cardozo is arguing for a 
regulatory purpose for the rule, it’s not clear that such a purpose 
argues for his result.  If the parties in the industry did not respond by 
making their contracts more certain, as Macaulay’s article suggests 
happened, then what exactly did the regulatory approach accomplish, 
other than to reduce the benefits of the contracting device?  An 
ongoing debate rages among contract law theorists about whether the 
indefiniteness rule is more about fulfilling the parties’ intentions or 
about regulating contracting behavior, or whether those two 
approaches are even really distinct.  Cardozo’s opinion does nothing 
to clarify this debate, however. 
E. Antitrust Concerns 
Finally, suppose there was something to the concerns about 
 
211 Cf. VICTOR GOLDBERG, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon With Help From 
The Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Harvard 
University Press 2006). Another contract around the same time had an explicit best efforts 
provision.  Goldberg argues from that fact that Cardozo should not have implied one in 
Wood. 
212 In St. Regis Paper Co., recall that Cardozo cited this case in his opinion but did not 
address the fact that the contract in that case had an express termination clause.  St. Regis 
Paper Co., 138 N.E. at 496. 
213 See, e.g., Geis, supra note 9, at 1716-18 (suggesting that courts should fill in gaps in 
contracts only when the parties have made “efficient upfront investments in contractual 
specificity” to discourage parties from deliberately leaving gaps to take advantage of an 
“embedded option” – the possibility that a court might fill in the gap with a term favorable to 
one side – and to “prevent parties from externalizing contracting costs to the courts”). 
61
Cohen: The Uncertainty of Sun Printing
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
144 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
antitrust violations in the paper industry and consider the contract 
from that perspective.  One plausible explanation for the longer price 
duration term in the Canadian Export Paper Company contract is that 
the Canadian Export Paper Company, for some reason, decided not to 
go along with the collusive prices in the paper industry as much as 
Remington expected it to.  In modern parlance, the Canadian Export 
Paper Company may have been “cheating” on the cartel.  It turned 
out to be a price cutter, not a price leader.  Another related possibility 
is that market prices were not as high in January 1920 as the 
newsprint manufacturers wanted, and Remington might have 
(secretly) agreed with other manufacturers to reduce its output and 
abandoned the Sun Printing contract because the large quantity in that 
contract exceeded Remington’s production “quota.”  Either of these 
possibilities makes Remington’s decision to abandon the contract 
troubling not only from a contract perspective, but from an antitrust 
perspective as well (though of course antitrust concerns are typically 
not a factor in contract law cases).  On the other hand, if Remington 
breached simply to sell the full quantity on the spot market (a fact on 
which I have no evidence, and which seems unlikely), Remington’s 
breach could have helped alleviate Congress’s concern with the 
“shortage” of newsprint available to the smaller publishers at the 
time. 
CONCLUSION 
I put myself in the camp that finds Cardozo’s Sun Printing 
opinion disappointing and inconsistent with a number of his other 
contract law opinions.  He justified failure to enforce a contract that 
even he conceded involved an actual opportunistic attempt by the 
seller to escape an assumed risk by impugning imagined 
opportunistic behavior by the buyer.214  He railed against contract 
revision and imposed terms when, as I believe both the textual and 
the contextual evidence shows, there was a plausible and sensible 
way to resolve the indefiniteness consistent with the express and 
implied intentions of the parties.215  It is ironic that Cardozo, the 
 
214 By contrast, as Professor Kaufman writes, “[a]cting with honor, fulfilling a duty, 
accepting responsibility, and keeping promises were important themes in Cardozo’s equity, 
torts, and contracts opinions.”  KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 359. 
215 By contrast, in his other contract opinions, Cardozo proceeded from the “need to bring 
common law doctrine into line with evolving social or economic conditions,” KAUFMAN, 
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judge who preferred writing opinions that avoided sweeping 
statements of rules and preserved “options for the future,”216 was so 
unforgiving in this case of contracting parties reasonably trying to do 
the same thing. It is equally ironic that he so fervently believed that 
his legally ambiguous and factually mistaken opinion would 
encourage certainty in business transactions. 
Some may be tempted to conclude from Cardozo’s blunder 
that if even the great Cardozo cannot understand the business context, 
how can we hope other judges to do so (except perhaps for the 
Posners and Easterbrooks of the world).  Thus, they should not 
attempt to do so, but instead should stick to textualism.  I do not draw 
that conclusion.  The contract and surrounding circumstances in this 
case were not so hard to understand, and enforcing the contract here 
would be consistent with both textualist and contextualist approaches.  
If Sun Printing’s lawyers had done a better job explaining these 
things (as Llewellyn argued), I am confident Cardozo would have 
reached the right result.  To me, the lesson of Sun Printing is that 
continually striving to improve lawyers’ and courts’ understanding of 
contracting conduct and context will lead to better, and more certain, 
transactions and law.  To paraphrase the great judge, we must revise 
our understanding so that courts may better construe. 
 
 
supra note 86, at 358, and “looked to contemporary commercial practice for enlightenment.”  
KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 359. 
216 KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 358. The passage from which this phrase comes aptly 
describes Cardozo’s opinion in Sun Printing.  Professor Kaufman wrote that Cardozo: 
used the record in each case to produce a sharp vision of the relevant 
evidence. In the important cases at the crossroads of doctrine, he usually 
sought to write an opinion that dealt with the problem but that decided 
no more than necessary. Many Cardozo opinions therefore appear to 
have been decided on unique facts, for Cardozo usually did not 
emphasize which facts were decisive. . . . They preserved options for the 
future. 
KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 358. 
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